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MUNICIPAL CHARTERS IN FLORIDA:
LAW AND DRAFTING
MANNING

J. DAUER

AND GEORGE JOHN MILLER

Florida has some three hundred municipal corporations, in which
almost two thirds of its three million residents live., Expenditures
of these governmental units came to some $122,290,000 on preliminary
estimate for 1952, approximately one fifth of the entire amount spent
by the state, the counties, the schools, and all local units during that
year.2 Consequently the law of municipal corporations and the maintenance of adequate and efficient local government are matters of
importance, financially as well as socially and technically, to the jurist,
the political scientist, the taxpayer, and the public in general. In
analyzing municipal law, state constitutional provisions are the starting
point. This approach is vital in any study of what, in a sense, might be
termed the organic law of the municipality, its charter.
This article is designed to sketch the boundaries of the legal area
within which the Florida municipality must operate and to point up
the major factors that influence the building of a sound and adequate
'The chief difficulty in tabulating is the lack of any system for compelling
rescission of the charter of a city that has become inactive; surrender of franchise
under FLA. STAT. §165.26 (1951) is optional. The 1950 federal census shows 305

incorporated cities and towns in Florida, although at least two of these had no
population. The more active operating municipalities report to the state comp-

troller and draw their share of the cigarette tax; 277 cities were recognized for
this purpose in 1952.
2Compilation and estimates are by Wylie Kilpatrick, Research Prof. of Economics, Bur. of Bus. and Econ. Res., U. of Fla. Estimate is made from U. S.
Census Bur. and state comptroller partial figures. See also DovELL, KNOW YOUR
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN FLORIDA (1953), U. of Fla. Pub. Adm'n Clearing

Serv. Civic Info. Ser. No. 15. The state expenditure used in this comparison includes the substantial special state funds earmarked by statutes as continuing appropriations in addition to funds biennially appropriated by the Legislature. The break-

down by types of units for 1952 is approximately as follows: State government,
$227,784,000, excluding aid to counties and cities in order to avoid counting these
funds twice; county government, $62,092,000; school districts, $115,989,000, about
2/3 of which was spent on schools within cities and accordingly would be carried
in some states as part of city revenues but which is here excluded from city totals
inasmuch as cities do not control it in Florida; special districts, $5,340,000; and
cities, $122,290,000. The total for all units below the federal level is just over
$533,495,000.

[413]
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charter, without, however, purporting to discuss the myriad ramifications of each factor. Broadly speaking, the draftsman must at the
outset determine the available means of establishing a municipality;
the type of local government desired; the personnel structure, including qualifications, direct and indirect compensation, and methods
of selection involved; the physical boundaries; and those standard
general powers needed by every city or town, designated popularly
under such broad headings as police power, taxation, fiscal control and
capital outlay, right to acquire and construct physical property, public utilities, whether operated publicly or by enfranchising private
corporations, and educational and library facilities. He must further
consider carefully the special problems that have arisen in recent
years in such fields as hospitals, recreation, advertising and public
events, airports, seaports, public housing, and motor vehicle parking;
the future expansion of boundaries, including annexation; the relations between city and county; and the practicable methods for
amending the charter, including initiative and referendum or any other
device fostering local control, to the extent that state law permits.
Finally, of course, he should not overlook those miscellaneous general
provisions covering such matters as discipline, personal interest, public records, oath of office, official bonds, authority to investigate,
schedule and succession, effective date, severability, and short title.
The police power alone, constantly expanding as citizens heap
more and more burdens on their local government, embraces not
only police surveillance in the narrow sense, fire protection, water
supply, sewage disposal, common carriers, and public health, but
also problems, vital today, in traffic and parking control, zoning,
slum clearance, and establishment of minimum standards for goods
and services. Yet the city fathers cannot safely assume that everything having a bearing on health, safety and morals can be controlled
- let alone operated - under a general catch-all clause. 3 Furthermore,
as regards those powers sometimes termed "special," each such power
may well be as vital to the healthy growth of a particular city, situated
in an atypical area or depending for the income of its citizens on abnormal enterprises and facilities, as is any standard, old-line general
power.
At the outset, of course, a practically suitable and legally valid
method of promulgating the charter must be selected and eventually
followed; and the legal status of the municipality under the organic
3E.g., FLA. STAT. §167.21, final clause (1951).
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and statutory law of any given state must be analyzed. Accordingly
we begin our somewhat more detailed discussion by focusing attention
on these basic considerations of municipal status and the procedural
methods of attaining it. To facilitate cross-referencing each main
heading is numbered in roman and each principal subheading in
arabic; footnote cross-references accordingly comprise two numerals
only. A table of all headings is appended.
I. LEGAL STATUS

A state constitution is a limitation on the otherwise unfettered
power of a legislature within the broad field of activity reserved to
the states, 4 whereas the Constitution of the United States is a grant
of enumerated powers. The municipal charter resembles the latter
in this respect. The familiar McCulloch v. Maryland5 doctrine of
implied powers reaches even to this level. 6 The municipality in
Florida, as in most jurisdictions, enjoys by comparison one important
advantage and suffers under what, to those governing, is a disadvantage.
The advantage is that it picks up several useful powers granted by
the Florida Legislature to municipalities generally. The disadvantage
is that the Supreme Court of Florida, like most other state high courts,
is inclined to interpret charter provisions as they are written, in line
with the long-established canon of construing strictly all public and
private charters. It is far less prone than is its federal counterpart to
twist phrases out of all bounds in order to promote a preconceived
policy of governmental aggrandizement.7 A presumption of reasonableness obtains as regards the manner of exercising a municipal
4See, e.g., the concise summarization by Strum, J., in Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 1,
17, 126 So. 308, 315 (1930).
54 Wheat. 316 (U.S. 1819).
oCompare, e.g., Ginsberg v. Daytona Beach, 103 Fla. 168, 137 So. 253 (1931)
(power to construct improvement implies power to contract and to execute note
in payment), with Malone v. City of Quincy, 66 Fla. 62, 62 So. 922 (1913) (authority
to regulate earth-closets does not imply power to prohibit completely). See, for a
recent statement of the Florida view, Pensacola v. Fillingim, 46 So.2d 876 (Fla.
1950) (holding that FLA. STAT. §210.03 (1951) does not by implication authorize
city expenditure of cigarette tax to finance construction of municipal recreational
auditorium and pier).
7
E.g., Wickard v. Filburu, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (farmer growing 239 bushels
of wheat above federal quota for own use on own farm is nevertheless "in" interstate commerce). Prof. Dauer does not concur in this comparison on the ground
that municipal charters are relatively easy to amend but the Federal Constitution
is not; thus there is greater need of liberal interpretation as to the Federal Con-
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power admittedly possessed, but the municipality bears the burden
of establishing in the first place the existence of a power claimed.8
Legally, the Florida municipal corporation is a creature of the
state.9 Therefore no municipality may be created except under state
authority, nor may it exercise powers other than those granted directly
by the Constitution or authorized by valid general or special acts.
In this regard Florida follows what is sometimes called "Dillon's
Rule" as to the status of municipal corporations, a doctrine also
adopted in other states.' 0 The Florida Supreme Court has clearly
stated:"'
"Unlike a county, a municipality is not a subdivision of
the State with subordinate attributes of sovereignty in the performance of governmental functions and correlative limited
privileges, immunities and exemptions from liability for negligence of its employees ....
[It] is a legal entity consisting
of population and defined area, with such governmental functions and also corporate public improvement authority as may
be conferred by law in a charter or other legislative enactment
under the Constitution."
II.

METHODS OF ESTABLISHMENT

In general the various states utilize one or more of five methods
in establishing and organizing cities and in granting their charters:
stitution. Prof. Miller believes that the federal instrument, in view of the extreme
generality of its terms, can be interpreted as written while still allowing ample
flexibility, and that "liberal" government means that further federal control should
be obtained by grant from the people under the prescribed amending process
rather than by the fiat of five out of nine political appointees.
8E.g., compare State ex rel. McAuley v. York, 90 Fla. 625, 106 So. 418 (1925),
with State ex rel. Meredith v. Borman, 138 Fla. 149, 189 So. 669 (1939), and Nash
v. Vaughn, 133 Fla. 499, 182 So. 827 (1938).
9See II, 1 infra; see, e.g., Miami v. Rosen, 151 Fla. 677, 682, 10 So.2d 307, 309
(1942); Tampa v. Easton, 145 Fla. 188, 191, 198 So. 753, 754 (1940).
IoSee DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 154, 155 (5th ed. 1911); 2 MCQUILLIN,

THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 592 (3d ed., Smith, 1949).
"1Tampa v. Easton, 145 Fla. 188, 191, 198 So. 753, 754 (1940). In State ex rtl.
Floyd v. Noel, 124 Fla. 852, 854, 169 So. 549, 550 (1936), the term "powers inherent
in municipal corporations" is used, but this reference should be dismissed as
merely a careless phrase. It is not doctrine. The general rule is that stated above.
For certain purposes a city is "an agent of the state for local administration of
governmental affairs," but even in this function it may not exceed the powers
granted, Loeb v. Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 429, 437, 134 So. 205, 207 (1931).
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(1) general statute; (2) special act; (3) a system of classifying cities
according to population; (4) the constitutional municipal home rule
system, under which the state constitution prohibits the legislature
from enacting local legislation by special act and delegates to each
city the power to frame its own charter with the approval of its voters
and under limitations of state general law; and (5) the optional
charters system, under which the legislature enacts various types
of model charters, such as the council-manager form, the mayorcouncil form and the commission form, and the city selects the form
it desires.12 Florida cities operate primarily under a combination
of systems (1) and (2), general law plus special legislation. The
system of classified charters was attempted but has never become
operative. Florida also offers a statutory system of limited home rule
for altering wholly or partially the charters of existing cities and
13
towns in certain designated respects.
1. Florida Constitutional Provisions
Florida is now operating under its fifth Constitution, adopted in
1885 and effective January 1, 1887.14 Nearly a hundred amendments
have been passed since its adoption, including important changes in
the organic law relating to municipalities. Without indulging in
legal history for the mere joy of academic pursuit we must nevertheless trace the evolution of the major current sections governing
creation and abolition of municipalities and amendment of their
charters. 15
12The general picture in other states is best given by KNEIER, CrrY

GOVERNMENT

(rev. ed. 1947); MACDONALD, AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINIMSTRATION (1951).
There is a sixth system of state control over
cities, known as geographic classification, but this is not widely used and in practice has amounted to special legislation, or system (2) above.
13FLA. STAT. c. 166 (1951); see VIII, 2 infia.
14For a summary of our constitutional evolution see Legis., 3 U. OF FLA. L. REv.
74 (1950).
'GLandmark opinions on the establishment and legal status of Florida municipalities appear, starting with the earliest, in State ex rel. McQuaid v. County
Comm'rs of Duval County, 23 Fla. 483, 3 So. 193 (1887); Enterprise v. State ex rel.
Att'y Gen., 29 Fla. 128, 10 So. 740 (1892); State ex rel. Lamar v. Dillon, 32 Fla.
545, 14 So. 383 (1893); Pursley v. Fort Myers, 87 Fla. 428, 100 So. 366 (1924); State
ex rel. Johnson v. Sarasota, 92 Fla. 563, 109 So. 473 (1926); State ex rel. Davis v.
City of Stuart, 97 Fla. 69, 120 So. 335 (1929); West v. Lake Placid, 97 Fla. 127, 120
So. 361 (1929); Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 1, 126 So. 308 (1930); State ex rel. Att'y
Gen. v. Avon Park, 108 Fla. 641, 149 So. 409 (1933); State ex rel. Matthews v. Alsop,
IN THE UNrrED STATES C. 4
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The Constitution of 1868, in the municipal field, stressed uniformity. In it are found the current Sections 20, 21 and 24 of Article
III in embryo.'0 In 1885, however, the electorate started on another
path; it presented the Legislature with virtually a blank check,
while at the same time admonishing it to aim at classification and
general laws as the ultimate target. Section 24 directed the Legislature to establish a uniform system of county and municipal government, to be applicable except in those instances in which local or
special laws inconsistent therewith were enacted. The language of
Section 20, enumerating flat prohibitions against special or local
laws on certain matters, specifically excepted regulation of municipal
officers and courts from its constraint. Section 21 in its original form
expressly authorized special or local laws in all fields not listed in
Section 20,17 provided sixty days' notice of intention to apply for
any such bill was published in the locality to be affected. Meanwhile,
however, a sweeping new section appeared simultaneously:18
"The Legislature shall have power to establish, and to
abolish, municipalities to provide for their government, to
prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to alter or amend
the same at any time. When any municipality shall be abolished, provision shall be made for the protection of its creditors."
Dispute promptly arose in State ex rel. McQuaid v. County Comm'rs
of Duval County.' 9 Mr. Justice Raney, in a brilliant piece of analyti120 Fla. 628, 163 So. 80 (1935); Winter Haven v. State ex rel. Landis, 125 Fla.
390, 170 So. 100 (1936); State ex rel. Gibbs v. Couch, 139 Fla. 353, 190 So. 723
(1939); State ex rel. Harrington v. Pompano, 136 Fla. 730, 188 So. 610 (1938),
aff'd on rehearing,136 Fla. 775, 188 So. 629 (1939); Winter Haven v. A. M. Klemm
and Son, 132 Fla. 334, 181 So. 153 (1938), 141 Fla. 75, 192 So. 646 (1939); A. M.
Klemm & Son v. Winter Haven, 141 Fla. 60, 192 So. 652 (1939); Tampa v. Easton, 145
Fla. 188, 198 So. 753 (1940).
16Fr. CONsr. Art. IV, §§17, 18 and 21-22 respectively (1868).
17This grant was unnecessary, of course, because the Legislature has inherent
power to act in any manner not constitutionally proscribed. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Johnson v. Sarasota, 92 Fla. 563, 585, 109 So. 473, 480 (1926).
18FrA. CONSr. Art. VIII, §8. The comma that should appear after "municipalities" is missing in the original. Additional authority to establish municipal courts
is contained id. Art. V, §34, unaltered by the later amendment to Art. V, §1.
1923 Fla. 483, 3 So. 193 (1887). For a recent decision to the same effect as regards the pre-1938 law see, e.g., Demko v. Judge, 58 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1952) (special
act abolition in 1933 of municipality with neither notice nor referendum per-
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cal reasoning approved by the full Court, reached the conclusion that
this new section would be superfluous if governed by the notice proviso of Section 21 of Article III- as indeed it would- and that accordingly the requirement of notice was confined to local legislation
dealing with other than municipal matters. For over four decades
the law remained unchanged.
In 1928 the notice period in Section 21 was reduced to thirty
days and an alternative procedure was authorized, namely, provision
in a special or local bill for referendum in the territory affected. In
1934 a new sentence was added to Section 24, banning "special or
local laws incorporating cities or towns, providing for their government, jurisdiction, powers, duties and privileges . .. " The amendment is not self-executing, however, and the Supreme Court cannot
feasibly issue a writ of mandamus to the Legislature to enact the
prescribed general law; accordingly it has regarded the ban as dormant pending passage of such a statute, 20 especially inasmuch as
Article VIII, Section 8 has remained intact since 1885.
The latest significant shift in trend appeared in 1938, when Article
III, Section 21 received by amendment the specific clause ". . . nor
shall any local or special law establishing or abolishing municipalities,
or providing for their government, jurisdiction and powers, or altering
or amending the same, be passed," without either publication of
notice as prescribed by law or provision in the bill for its approval
by referendum as a prerequisite to its becoming effective. The current law governing notice requires either at least one publication, not
less than thirty days prior to introduction of the bill, in some newspaper published in the county or counties affected, or posting in
"not less than three public places in the county or each of the counties" affected, one of which must be the county courthouse. 21 The
Court has accordingly insisted upon notice or referendum as prerequisites to the validity of even special or local municipal acts passed
22
in the 1939 session of the Legislature or thereafter.
missible because occurring prior to 1938 amendment requiring one or the other).
20E.g., Bryan v. Miami, 139 Fla. 650, 190 So. 772 (1939).
21F.A. STAT. §11.02 (1951); see §11.03 for further particulars on form of notice.
Note that posting is illogically yet apparently sufficient, however, even if a newspaper is available, under the odd decision in Chavous v. Goodbred, 158 Fla. 826,

30 So.2d 370 (1947); see, however, the strong and logical dissent by Buford, J.

"Goodbred" is misspelled in the official reports; it should be "Goodbread," as in
156 Fla. 599, 23 So.2d 761 (1945).
22E.g., Chavous v. Goodbred, 158 Fla. 826, 30 So.2d 370 (1947); State ex rel.
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The result today is a strict, though not onerous, procedural limitation on the original scope, virtually unlimited, of Article VIII,
Section 8, and at the same time an unavoidable implication that a
special or local act properly passed is in order for any municipality
whenever the Legislature chooses to utilize this method of functioning.
The prescribed classification of towns and cities and uniformity in
their regulation await the pleasure of the Legislature; from this standpoint Section 24 of Article III is a dead letter. Perhaps it deserves
such a fate; attempts in other states at rigid general laws for fixed
population brackets have hardly produced scintillating practical
results.23
2. CurrentFlorida Statutory Methods
The Florida statutes today provide two methods of organizing a
municipal corporation: general law and special act.
General Law. Under general law the area to be incorporated
must contain at least one hundred fifty citizens, male or female, who
are freeholders24 and registered voters. 25 Notice of the time and place
Watson v. Miami, 153 Fla. 653, 15 So.2d 481 (1943). The mandatory vote by
freeholders alone on a proposed bond issue, FLA. CONsT. Art. IX, §6, satisfies the
referendum requirement for this one matter, but not for other items, State v. Port
St. Joe, 47 So.2d 584 (Fla. 1950). The related problem arising from passage of a
special act in the guise of a general act regulating counties, and the proper use
and misuse of population brackets, is outside the scope of this article, but is well
illustrated in the contrast between Crandon v. Hazlett, 157 Fla. 574, 26 So.2d 638
(1946), and State v. Dade County, 157 Fla. 859, 27 So.2d 283 (1946).
23See A. C. Breckenridge, The Mockery of Classification, 36 NAT. MUNIC. REV.
571-573 (1947); as regards Florida see Batchelor, Population Statutes under the
Florida Constitution, 1 MIATM L. Q. 97 (1947), especially at 102-104.
24FLA. STAT. §165.01 (1951). If the resulting corporation has 300 or more registered voters it is a city; if less, a town, id. §165.02. A registered voter owning land
in the area is a freeholder under this statute, even though not so listed by the
supervisor of registration; the question is one of fact to be determined as of
the time of meeting, Coreytown v. State ex rel. Ervin, 60 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1952)
(containing a thorough and well-reasoned opinion).
25FL.. STAT..- §165.29 (1951), enacted as Fla. Laws 1947, c. 23615, §1, bars application of this general law procedure to communities in at least one county;
and other counties may move in and out of the excluded population bracket of
150,000 through 250,000. It is submitted that there is no excuse whatever for this
haphazard, stop-gap type of legislation, especially when, as here, the substantive
legislation does not apply unless action is desired and taken. See FLX. CONST. Art.
VII, §5, adopted in 1950, re census.
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of the organizational meeting must be published "for a period of not
less than thirty days" in a newspaper of the county or be posted in
three different places "of public resort in the immediate vicinage
.... ,26 At least two thirds of the freeholders and voters to be incorporated must attend the meeting.2 7 They then proceed to elect
by majority vote a mayor, from five to nine aldermen, a city clerk,
and a marshal. The terms of office of all but the aldermen are one
year. These last divide themselves by lot into two groups, as nearly
equal in number as possible, one of which serves for one year and the
other for two; and thereafter all aldermen are elected for two-year
terms. Those attending the meeting are also required to establish
the geographic limits of the town and to adopt a name and a corporate
seal.
Two steps are then necessary to validate the proceedings. First
the mayor, within three days, must go before a judicial officer of the
state and take a prescribed oath, which he then administers to the
other elected officials. Next the clerk must prepare a complete transcript of the proceedings, including notice of meeting, number of
qualified electors present, official name, seal, record of the meeting,
boundaries adopted, and names of officers elected. This transcript
must bear the corporate seal and attestation of the clerk, be signed
by the mayor and aldermen, and be forthwith filed with the clerk
of the circuit court for the county. Thereupon the new municipality
is an incorporated city or town, as the case may be, endowed with
the powers granted by general law.
Special Act. The alternative method of organizing a municipal
corporation in Florida is special legislation.28 The interested citizens,
before or during the biennial session of the Legislature, draft an
appropriate city charter in consultation with the members of the
26fFLA. STAT. §165.03 (1951). This paragraph and the following one are a summary of FLA. STAT. §§165.04-165.08 (1951); see note 24 supra for distinction between city and town.
27FLA. STAT. §165.04 (1951) contains the further clause "and not less than
twenty-five," but these words are deliberately omitted from the above summary.
Today they are meaningless; 2/3 of 150 is 100, which is now the smallest number
possible. The minimum of 150 was substituted for the original 25 in §165.01 by recent amendment. At that time the draftsman obviously forgot to make the
change in the corresponding language in §165.04.
2The authority and procedural requisites for this procedure are set forth
in the Constitution; see II, I supra.
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House and Senate from the county and senatorial district in question. 20
Thereupon, if the one to three members of the House from that county
and the senator from that district are in agreement, the proposed
special bill is in practice introduced and automatically passed in each
house. The legislative rules of each house prescribe a special calendar
for local bills, which are not debated in the House unless there is a
division of opinion among the members representing the county in
which the proposed municipality is located, and which are passed or
rejected in the Senate in accordance with the recommendation of the
senator from the district involved. These bills are subject to the
constitutional requirement of notice or referendum. 30
III. TYPES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
The basic form of city government provided by Florida general
law is suitable for the small municipality only. Change in a city
charter to authorize a different form of government is necessary in
many instances; and accordingly it is desirable to consider the possible
forms of city government that may be adopted.
1. Mayor-Council
The form provided by general law is the oldest, the mayor-council
type. With modifications it is still found in many cities, for instance,
Orlando and Tampa. It embodies the doctrine of separation of powers
to a considerable extent. The council enacts ordinances and acts
as the legislative authority. The mayor, elected directly by the voters,
heads the administration, although as the town grows he needs and
usually appoints department heads to assist him. The municipal
judge is the chief officer of the third branch, and he may be appointed
or elected. In some smaller municipalities, however, the mayor performs the judicial function.
This traditional form of city government has its defects. The separation-of-powers doctrine is not well adapted to local administration,
especially as regards the legislative and executive functions; city functions, as compared with federal and state, are primarily administrative
29Florida's 38 senators, unlike federal senators, are chosen on a population basis,
one from each senatorial district. Representatives, FLA. CONST. Art. VII, §3,
adopted in 1924, now number 3 from each of the 5 most populous counties, 2
from each of the next 18, and I each from the other 45. Reapportionment by
the Legislature is prescribed for 1925 and every 10 years thereafter, ibid.
3oSee II, 1 supra.
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in that they are normally performed with fewer officials, less formality,
a far lower budget, and a desirable interplay among departments. By
the turn of the century many municipalities began to regard this form
of government as inefficient. Deadlock between mayor and council,
as well as ward politics among council members chosen from city
districts rather than at large, gave rise to criticism.
2. City Commission
When in 1900 Galveston, Texas, was faced with a crisis following
a tidal wave it set up a different form of government, known as the
commission type. The voters elect, preferably at large, a city commission consisting of five members in most instances. These commissioners have full legislative power as a body and executive power
as individuals. Not only do they enact city ordinances but each commissioner is also the head of a city department; one may head finance,
another public works, another public safety, that is, fire and police,
and another public recreation and health. One is chosen as mayor,
but he is simply the presiding officer when the commission meets.
Together they set policies, levy taxes, make up the budget, and coordinate the work of their respective departments.
In some instances this system has worked well. It is simpler than
the mayor-council plan, and responsibility is concentrated. But it
too suffers from marked weaknesses. There is so much work for each
commissioner that proper performance of his duties usually demands
his full time. Furthermore there is no guarantee that a person specially
skilled in finance will be elected to head that department, and the
same random assignment of responsibility occurs in the other departments. As a result still a third form of city government emerged as
the commission form began to decline; and today, although the
second form still exists in the cities of some states, the last vestige
of it in a Florida city of any size is found in Jacksonville. Even there
the pure type has been sharply modified into a hybrid of the mayorcouncil and the commission forms.
3. Council-Manager
The third type of city government, which appeared in Staunton,
Virginia, in 1908, is the council-manager form.3 Like the commission
3

Sumter, S.C., adopted it in 1912; Dayton, Ohio, in 1913. These two cities,
along with Staunton, have a valid claim to being the first to adopt this system in
full.
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form it concentrates responsibility, although in a decidedly different
way. The voters elect a city commission, but it functions in the
manner exhibited by the board of directors of a private corporation.
It acts as the legislative body of the city, usually meeting weekly to
enact ordinances, approve the budget, levy taxes, and decide policy.
Preferably its members are elected at large and choose one of their
number as mayor to preside over their meetings, but he has no administrative functions. Instead the commission selects a trained city
manager, who is normally chosen from among the managers or assistant managers of other cities. His work is strictly administrative, not
political; his is a profession. He does not set major policy; the commission determines that. He recommends a budget to the commission,
which decides all matters pertaining to it. On the other hand, he
selects the heads of city departments, directs and coordinates their
work, and has general responsibility for the administration of the
city.
The National Municipal League regards this system as the most
efficient form of city government in existence today,32 and many
Florida cities now share this view. Prior to the 1953 Legislature fiftyseven Florida cities, including Miami, Miami Beach, Pensacola and
St. Petersburg, had the full manager form. Another dozen have a
partial version of it, and still others are voting by referendum this
year on the issue of adopting it.
Nevertheless even this form is not a cure-all. Citizen interest is
necessary to assure election of high-caliber members to the commission, who must in turn select a qualified manager. This quality is
not achieved in some cities. If the post is regarded as a political plum,
or if the manager is incapable or poorly qualified anyhow, the system
will not operate well. There is no magic in any form of government.
The most that any good system can do is to blueprint a device that
human beings can run well if they will apply themselves; its optimum
operation demands elected policy-makers of vision, sound judgment
and integrity and appointed administrators with that efficiency born
of academic training in the techniques involved and practical training
on the job.
Two checks operate in the city manager system to prevent abuses:
civil service and the recall election. Virtually all Florida cities of
any size have a system of civil service, and the Model City Charter
a2See MoDEL Crry CHARTER (5th ed. 1941), obtainable from Nat. Municipal
League, 299 Broadway, New York 7, N.Y.; price $1.50.
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also includes this provision. 33 This system shields the professional administrator from the political pressures to which he is inevitably subjected. On the other hand, recall can by charter provision or special
act be provided to deal with unresponsive policy-makers whenever
the voters in requisite percentage sign a petition calling for a special
election to remove a particular member of the city commission; and
most Florida city charters embodying the city manager system so
provide.3 4 The recall election is usually held within from twenty to
forty days of validation of the petition.
Should the Commission fail to call the election following due
filing of a valid petition the circuit court can order one. In Williams
v. Keyes-5 the Supreme Court affirmed circuit court issuance of a
mandatory injunction pursuant to a section in the Miami special
act charter expressly providing for judicial enforcement. In view
of the tenor of the opinion each municipality should by special act
secure such a provision in its charter, even though there is no valid
reason for refusing mandamus, as distinct from injunction, under
these circumstances. It is unquestionably the proper means of compelling a public official to exercise the ministerial function, that is,
performance of a duty prescribed by law and involving no discretion; 36
and the Court has stoutly denied the existence of any authority in
33FLA. STAT. c. 174 (1951) provides for adoption, subject to referendum approval,
of a civil service system for policemen and firemen in cities of less than 125,000.
Most Florida cities cover other employees by special acts, ordinances, and provisions of their charters. The MODEL Crry CHARTER provision is Art. VII; see note
32 supra for availability.
-- E.g., Daytona Beach, Gainesville, Miami. If the petition fails to comply
with a legal requirement that the grounds for recall be stated in a preliminary
affidavit the election can be permanently enjoined, Richard v. Tomlinson, 49
So.2d 798 (Fla. 1951); cf. Williams v. Kelly, 133 Fla. 244, 182 So. 881 (1938) (requisite percentage of registered voters signing petition not established); but if the
commissioner attacked announces that he will not contest the proceedings he
waives his right to judicial review of procedural technicalities and of the sufficiency of grounds, Long v. Lancaster, 55 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1951).
35135 Fla. 769, 186 So. 250 (1938), Buford, J., dissenting on jurisdictional
grounds. Brown and Thomas, JJ., dissented as to the power of a circuit court
to hold an election, but agreed that it has power to order one, and indicated, id.
at 802, 186 So. at 263, that mandamus rather than mandatory injunction is the
preferable remedy. The election was held and Williams was recalled, see Williams
v. Miami, 42 So.2d 582 (Fla. 1949). The 1938 opinion quotes excerpts of drafting
value from the charter.
-lThis basic characteristic of mandamus is fully discussed by Goodrich and
Cone, Mandamus in Florida, 4 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 535 (1951).
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the Legislature to alter in any degree the constitutionally granted
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the circuit courts embodied
in mandamus and the other four extraordinary writs.3 The Williams v.
Keyes dissent, and perhaps the majority opinion, are confusing a
commendable desire to keep the judiciary out of politics with the
needed enforcement of a substantive right validly conferred. Jurisdiction specified in the Constitution obviously should not require
confirmation by either general or special act. Nevertheless the draftsman should play safe, however unfounded the doubt raised by the
bench may be from a juristic standpoint.
IV. INITIAL BOUNDARIES

In the establishment of boundaries neither the citizenry creating
a municipality under general law nor the Legislature by special act
has authority to incorporate noncontiguous territory3s or "unsettled
lands, or lands rural in character, or farms, citrus groves and forests
far removed from the actual boundaries of the village to be incorporated and sparsely settled . -- 39 Incorporation of territory with
so few inhabitants that the functions of a municipality cannot be
exercised is likewise invalid.40
Attack on either the existence of a municipal franchise or the
legality of an attempted exercise of an admittedly existing franchise
should be instituted by writ of quo warranto naming the municipality
as defendant.41 The plaintiff should request the attorney general to
37The grant is limited to the Supreme Court (or any justice thereof as regards
habeas corpus), the circuit courts, and the Court of Record for Escambia County,
FLA. CONsT. Art. V, §§5, 11, 39. The Court's sturdy defense of its constitutionally
granted jurisdiction embodied in the extraordinary writs is analyzed in detail in
Adams and Miller, Origins and Current Florida Status of the Extraordinary Writs,
4 U. or FLA. L. REv. 421, 459-462 (1951).
asMahood v. State ex rel. Davis, 101 Fla. 1254, 133 So. 90 (1931) (action by
residents under general law); State ex rel. Davis v. City of Stuart, 97 Fla. 69, 120
So. 355 (1929) (legislative act); cf. Ocean Beach Heights, Inc. v. Brown-Crummer
Inv. Co., 302 U.S. 614 (1938), reversing 87 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1937).
3aState ex rel. Landis v. Lake Placid, 121 Fla. 839, 845, 164 So. 531, 533 (1935);
accord, State ex rel. Davis v. City of Stuart, supra note 38. For a minor and
sensible exception to the contiguity requirement see Hall v. State ex rel. Ervin,
46 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1950).
40E.g., State ex rel. Ervin v. Oakland Park, 42 So.2d 270 (Fla. 1949); State
ex rel. Davis v. Boynton Beach,'129 Fla. 528, 177 So. 327 (1937); State ex rel.
Davis v. Lake Placid, 109 Fla. 419, 147 So. 468 (1933).
41FLA. STAT. §165.30 (1951), enacted as Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25275, §1. Examples
of quo warranto proceedings are: Coreytown v. State ex rel. Ervin, 60 So.2d 482

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1953

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1953], Art. 7
.MUNICIPAL CHARTERS

institute such suit, and if he refuses to do so any "person, or persons,
association of persons, or corporation" owning land within a city,
42
town or hamlet may then institute the proceedings.
A city cannot function de facto if there was initially no de jure
means by which it could have acquired legal existence or jurisdiction
over the territory claimed by it.43 If, however, the state has for years
assumed the existence and jurisdiction of a municipality, as evidenced
by legislative acts or other indicia of state recognition of the
questioned authority, the state is then "estopped" from attacking it
unless some organic barrier to such jurisdiction existed from the
start;4 4 and of course individuals acquiescing by positive action or
by continued inaction are either estopped or barred by laches from
5
challenging the jurisdiction.4
V. GENERAL POWERS OF MUNICIPALITIES

As we have previously observed, the Florida municipality has no
inherent governmental power; it derives such specific powers as it
(Fla. 1952); State ex rel. Ervin v. Oakland Park, supra note 40; Ormond v. State
ex rel. Watson, 152 Fla. 419, 12 So.2d 114 (1943). The Coreytown opinion, supra,
confirms the civil nature of modem quo warranto and the applicability of FLA.
C.L.R. 16, 32. For a full discussion of this writ see Ervin and Rhodes, Quo
Warranto in Florida, 4 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 559 (1951). The masterful opinion of
Brown, J., in State ex rel. Davis v. City of Stuart, 97 Fla. 69, 120 So. 335 (1929),
presents an excellent discussion of procedure.
42See note 41 supra. This 1949 expansion of an ancient remedy should largely
eliminate resort to bill for injunction against imposition of taxes when the attorney
general refuses to institute quo warranto proceedings. Farrington v. Flood, 40
So.2d 462 (Fla. 1949), is an example of final resort to equity after refusal of the
attorney general to file a quo warranto information under the pre-1949 law. The
proper uses of injunction in Florida are explained by Fabisinski and Cowart, Injunctive Relief in Florida, 4 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 571 (1951).
43Ocean Beach Heights, Inc. v. Brown-Crummer Inv. Co., 302 U.S. 614 (1938).
This decision follows and ably summarizes the Florida law. See also note 44 infra.
44E.g., Winter Haven v. State ex rel. Landis, 125 Fla. 392, 170 So. 100 (1936)
(late attack based on lack of boundary closure). This principle that the municipal
corporation may exist de facto despite some flaw in following the full legal process
required to establish it de jure follows Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Shephard, 185
U.S. 1 (1901) (alternative holding). Whitfield, J., explains the distinction between
initial organic barrier and curable defect in form in Winter Haven v. A. M. Klemm
& Son, 132 Fla. 334, 374-376, 181 So. 153, 170-171 (1938); cf. State ex rel. Landis
v. Boynton Beach, 129 Fla. 528, 177 So. 327 (1937).
45E.g., Heyward v. Hall, 144 Fla. 344, 198 So. 114 (1940) (attack on authority
of residents to incorporate initially held too late after long functioning and recognition of town); see also the annexation cases in note 189 infra.
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has from the Legislature, whether by general law or special act."1"
In rare instances the authority of the Legislature to accord special
treatment to a designated municipality springs directly from a special
provision of the Florida Constitution. 4 7 To analyze in comprehensive
fashion the scope of powers granted by general law would entail an
article of normal length for each major power. Accordingly we confine the discussion at this point to certain basic provisions and relationships that permeate all valid municipal drafting and to an enumeration
of those grants of authority that every Florida municipal corporation
falls heir to automatically at birth unless its charter contains some
limitation.
1. Constant Limitations
The special-act cliarter is itself a Florida statute, though not a
general one. The charter promulgated pursuant to general law is
not, strictly speaking, a statute, but it has the potency of one if
drafted and passed in the prescribed manner and within constitutional
and statutory limitations. Because of its relative rank in the hierarchy
of law the legislative output of the municipality, known in its typical
form as the ordinance, must always meet several tests. And of course
the other types of municipal functioning, whether executive, judicial,
or merely administrative, must square with all mandates, express or
implied, of senior rank.
The charter and the ordinance, like-all other Florida legislative
products and the Florida Constitution itself, must not contravene
federal law of whatever rank. In particular neither the charter nor
the ordinance can run afoul of such safeguards, ever in the background, as the due process clause, 48 the impairment of the obligation
of a contract clause, 49 or the commerce clause.50 There are, of course,
46See I supra.
47E.g., FLA. CoNsT. Art. VIII, §§9, 10.
48U.S. CoNsr. Amend. XIV, including Amend. 1 concepts; see, e.g., the Notes
on sound truck ordinances, 2 U. oF FiA,. L. Ray. 103, 257 (1949).
49E.g., Winter Haven v. A. M. Klemm & Son, 132 Fla. 334, 181 So. 153 (1938)
(holding invalid, as violation of both U.S. CoNsr. Art. I, §10, and FL4. CoNsr.
Decl. of Rights §17, a circuit court decree enjoining continued taxation of complainant's lands, after rendition of judgment of ouster, for purpose of paying bonds
issued prior to ouster while city had de facto and apparent de jure jurisdiction
over such lands); cf. Groves v. Board of Pub. Instr'n of Manatee County, 109 F.2d
522 (5th Cir. 1940) (same principle applied to impairment by reducing county
millage to the prejudice of bond payments).
50E.g., Henderson v. State ex rel. Lee, 65 So.2d 22 (Fla. 1953), following Amal-
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many other federal limitations, imposed by the exercise of such powers
as those with regard to war, treaties, postal regulation, patents, admiralty, and foreign commerce.
At the state level the charter and the ordinance, like the statute,
must remain within the limitations of the Florida Constitution.5 '
Furthermore, unless our organic law deals expressly with a particular
municipality, all municipal action must follow the dictates of any
applicable Florida statutes or judicial decision vesting rights and not
collaterally overturned on one of the few permissible grounds.52 The
Legislature gives, within expressed limits, and the Legislature takes
away.
2. Rank of Generaland Special Acts
The foregoing considerations lead quite naturally into the relative
rank of various statutes. The landmark Florida opinion on this subject is the brilliant analysis by Mr. Justice Brown in American Bakeries Co. v. Haines City. 53 The legislative intent governs; but canons
of construction are helpful, and when, as in American Bakeries, a
poorly drafted statute contradicts itself they are indispensable. Contemporaneous enactments are construed in pari materia. Inconsistent
provisions among statutes of the same class but different in time of
effectivity are reconciled as far as possible, in the absence of a repealing clause in the later; the bench frowns upon repeal by mere implication and strives to give effect to such legislative enactments unless they are expressly or by necessary implication repealed. When
two interpretations are possible and one renders the statute unconstitutional, the other interpretation is adopted.
In the event of "repugnancy," or head-on conflict, among statutes
gamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951). The
Florida decision was predicted in 5 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 205 (1952). See also, e.g.,
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
51E.g., Adams v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach, 60 So.2d 663 (Fla.
1952) (statute plus ordinance), analyzed V, 4 infra under Public Housing; Gustafson v. Ocala, 53 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1951), 4 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 403 (1951) (ordinance
violating Florida equal protection clause).
52E.g., Panama City v. State, 60r So.2d 658 (Fla. 1952) (ordinance violating
Constitution and not complying with statute, discussed V, 4 infra under Motor
Vehicle Parking); State ex rel. Warren v. Miami, 153 Fla. 644, 15 So.2d 449 (1943)
(ordinance contravening court judgment).
53131 Fla. 790, 180 So. 524 (1938), reviewing numerous earlier opinions. See
also the analysis in Sullivan v. Tampa, 101 Fla. 298, 134 So. 211 (1931).
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the later prevails as a rule. A later general statute supersedes any
earlier general statute in conflict with it, as distinct from merely inconsistent, even though the earlier be not expressly repealed. Similarly, a later special act supersedes a conflicting earlier special act and
also overrides an earlier or contemporary general statute even to the
extent of a mere inconsistency, the theory being that in a special
act the Legislature focuses its attention more sharply on the small
segment dealt with in isolation. 54
The serious problem of interpretation involves the effect of a
later general statute upon an earlier special act when the two are
either inconsistent or in conflict. Wide variance in terminology among
the statutes passed upon by the courts impairs formulation of any
comprehensive absolute rule; but normally the earlier special act
remains in effect unless the later general one repeals it specifically or
indicates in clear terms an intent to regulate all Florida municipalities
uniformly in the particular respect covered. In any of these last
events - and the language of the later general act is determinative in
each instance - the earlier special act must yield. 55 Competent draftsmanship would go a long way toward lightening the enormous workload that our bench is carrying today, including many problems of
statutory interpretation that should never arise in the first place.
3. Standard General Powers
Every municipality embraced in the category delineated by a
statute granting a power either to all cities or to those of a certain
54Compare, e.g., Sanders v. City of Coleman, 143 Fla. 455, 196 So. 822 (1940)
(inconsistent provisions of earlier general act held superseded by later special), and
Sanders v. Howell, 73 Fla. 563, 74 So. 802 (1917) (earlier special act held superior
to later inconsistent general act), with Lake Alfred v. Lawless, 102 Fla. 84, 135 So.
895 (1931) (both general and special statutes applicable as alternatives, there being
no inconsistency per se in having two valid methods of issuing bonds), and
Hallandale v. Broward County Kennel Club, Inc., 152 Fla. 266, 10 So.2d 810 (1942)
(later general act held to supersede earlier special because comprehensive intent
appeared in it). For priority of special act over conflicting general statute effective same day see State v. Avon Park, 96 Fla. 494, 118 So. 223 (1928) (bonds not
issued per special act held invalid).
55Compare, e.g., Hallandale v. Broward County Kennel Club, Inc., supra note
54, with Bryan v. Miami, 139 Fla. 650, 190 So. 772 (1939) (earlier restrictive provision in special act charter held not removed by implication by later general
statute). For an illustrative general statute see FLA. STAT. C. 166 (1951) and discussion of statutory municipal home rule, VIII, 2 infra.
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size is free to exercise it unless a relevant provision in the charter
expressly limits the authority of the particular municipality in that
respect. As a rule these "general powers" are an addition to charter
powers, with the result that the municipality may in its discretion
act pursuant to either its charter provision or the general grant unless
the charter expressly or by necessary implication confines a certain
power within specified limits narrower than those set by general law.56
Here, incidentally, is one of the many points at which careful preliminary consideration and accurate drafting can save a lot of confusion and eventual litigation.
As a rough generalization one might say that these standard general
powers are largely those that one would expect to find in local
government if the Florida municipality had inherent powers. They
authorize the municipality to provide for the election and fix the
compensation of its officers,57 to take a census, 58 to acquire real or
personal property by eminent domain for certain public purposes, 9
to accept voluntary surrender of private property subject to a lien for
improvements and to sell those portions of it not needed, 60 to erect
and control all necessary public buildings and dispose of them,61 to
construct wharves and docks and to regulate these and also moorings
and anchorages,6 2 to build bridges and establish ferries, 6 3 to lay streets,
drains and sewers and remove obstructions, 64 to light streets6 5 and
to beautify these and waterways, 66 to require abutting realty owners
56E.g., Herbert v. Daytona Beach, 121 Fla. 212, 215-216, 163 So. 565, 566 (1935)

(alternative special act charter method of issuing bonds upheld); Sullivan v.
Tampa, 101 Fla. 298, 134 So. 211 (1931) (alternative general act method upheld).
Compare, e.g., Lake Alfred v. Lawless, 102 Fla. 84, 135 So. 895 (1931) (nothing
in special act charter that would rule out the general law alternative used), with
State ex rel. Davis v. Homestead, 100 Fla. 361, 130 So. 28 (1930) (earlier special
act charter held exclusive).
57FLA. STAT. §§167.40-167.42 (1951).
5sFLA. STAT. §§167.58-167.60 (1951).
59FLA. STAT. §§167.65-167.66 (1951); see also §167.69 (acquiring land to sell or
lease to the United States for defense purposes).
6OFLA. STAT. §167.15 (1951).
61FLA. STAT. §167.21 (1951).
OSIbid.
631bid.
64FLA. STAT. §167.01 (1951); see also §§180.06 (drainage sewers), 357.01 (inspection
of railway crossings), 167.75 (permission to continue certain encroachments as they
existed on June 16, 1947).
65FLA. STAT. §167.21 (1951).
6FLA. STAT. §§342.01-342.03 (1951).
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to construct and repair sidewalks,6 7 to grade, drain and fill vacant
lots or require their owners to do so,6 to lay off and beautify parks,60
to improve and beautify the public cemetery,70 to pass zoning regulations,71 to construct, maintain and operate sanitary sewage disposal
systems,7 2 to dispose of garbage and other waste,7 3 to construct,
74
maintain and operate facilities for domestic and industrial water
gas and electric supply,- to grant franchises for furnishing public
services-6 and to regulate water,77 gas and electricity rates, 8 to provide for the support of the poor, infirm or insane7 9 and to establish
8
80
and maintain public schools and a public library. '
From the fiscal standpoint the underlying theory as regards current expenses is pay as you go. The theory on capital improvements,
however, is quite the opposite, and the apparent legal limitations on
it are essentially a mirage.
The general statute on current expenditures forbids appropriations
in excess of permissible tax levies for the year in question, and no
municipal officer may issue a warrant for any purpose other than to
pay a sum appropriated.8 2- Books of account must be kept; and the
law further provides that annual financial reports be filed with the
state comptroller, who may be directed by the Governor to make an
inspection and must be directed to do so whenever twenty percent
or more of the taxpaying electors so request. This provision is a
dead letter even today, however, and accordingly it is vital that the
67FLA. STAT.

§167.02 (1951).

68FLA. STAT. §§167.07, 167.08 (1951).
69FLA. STAT. §§167.09, 167.21 (1951).
70FLA. STAT. §167.21 (1951); see also §167.70 (cooperation with Federal Government authorized).
71FLA. STAT. c. 176 (1951); see also §167.71 (cooperation with FHA authorized).
Florida zoning law is thoroughly analyzed in this issue by Bartley, Legal Problems
in FloridaMunicipalZoning.
72FLA. STAT. §§184.03, 180.06 (1951).
73FLA. STAT. §180.06 (1951); see also §167.73 (reasonable charge allowed for

service).
74FLA. STAT. §§180.06, 167.21
75FLA. STAT. c. 172 (1951).
76FLA.

(1951).

STAT. §§167.06, 167.22-167.24

77FLA. STAT.

78FA. STAT.
79FLA. STAT.

(1951)

(includes forfeiture procedure).

§167.57 (1951).
§180.14 (1951).

§167.28

(1951).

solbid.
81FLA. STAT. §§167.29-167.39
82FLA. STAT. §167.48 (1951).

(1951).
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charter require an audit at least annually by disinterested certified
public accountants
and distribution in printed form to interested
3
citizens.S
The municipality is authorized not only to levy taxes on realty,
personalty, business, professions, and certain public services but also
to make reasonable charges for the use of "any facility designed and
intended to render a direct service to the users thereof ... ."84 It
may invest surplus funds in any "negotiable direct obligation" of
the United States or in an obligation guaranteed unconditionally by
the United States as to principal and interest; and it may issue revenue
certificates to obtain loans and may also issue bonds provided the
requisite approval of the freeholders is first obtained and the municipal
debt limit, if any, is not exceeded.85
Municipal financing in general, an extensive subject in itself, is
beyond the scope of this article. Florida does have a general law provision on bonded debt limit, but it is virtually worthless.8 6 It ex83FLA. STAT. §167.61 (1951). This provision is seldom if ever complied with
except in so far as cities have to file reports to recapture their share of the
cigarette tax. No system of state audit of city books has been instituted yet,
probably because of the shortage of personnel allowed the state auditor and because city charters usually require an audit by reputable accountants anyhow.
84.FLA. STAT. §167.43 (1951). Note the limiting yet sound construction of this
type of taxing power in Asbell v. Green, 159 Fla. 702, 32 So.2d 593 (1947) (blanket
sales tax embracing isolated transactions is not a tax on occupations). For tax on
public services see FLA. STAT. §167.431 (1951) (the "utility tax" levied on purchases of electricity, metered or bottled gas, and water, telephone and telegraph
service; seller must collect for city; limit is 10% of purchase price; and Gainesville,
in a move almost unique in modem times, actually reduced this tax to 5% on
Sept. 21, Gainesville Daily Sun, Sept. 22, 1953, p. 1, col. 6). On authority to
charge see FLA. STAT. §167.73(2) (1951); specifically listed, in addition to the
general language quoted above, are: "any system of public recreation, any wharf,
dock, yacht basin, airport, golf course, hospital, stadium, parking lot, or tourist
camp .... "
85 0n investing see FLA. STAT. §§167.74, 665.43 (1951). On bond borrowing see
FLA. CoNsr. Art. IX, §6, quoted in text at end of V infra; FLA. STAT. c. 169 (1951).
The loose and varying interpretations of these provisions by our Supreme Court
and the great expansion of municipal financing by revenue bonds are fully
treated in this issue by Patterson, Legal Aspects of Florida Municipal Bond
Financing,and Rose, Developments in Revenue Bond Financing. For an excellent,
detailed discussion of municipal debt and Florida municipal financing generally
see KILPATRICK, REVENUE AND DEBT OF FLORIDA MUNIcIPALrrIEs

AND

OVERLYING

GOVERNMENTS (1953), a comprehensive joint study by U. of Fla. Bur. of Econ. and
Bus. Res. and Pub. Adm'n Clearing Serv.
86FLA. SrAT. §169.04 (1951).
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pressly does not apply to "cities and towns which have special charters
from the legislature." Furthermore the Court excludes from the
computation all "revenue certificates," even in the erroneous sense
that it had ascribed to this term.8 7 The general law maximum on
bonded debt of a municipality is ten percent of the assessed value of
the real and personal property within the corporate limits, a figure
that changes with the annual assessments.8 8 This figure is a rubber
tape, however, for three reasons. First, the homestead tax amendment
and other grounds for exemption render approximately one-third in
assessed value of all Florida realty immune to payment of its fair
share - or indeed of any share at all - of the taxes required to finance
the many benefits that its owners demand and receive as a free ride
on the backs of their neighbors. Second, assessments vary widely from
county to county and municipality to municipality in relation to
actual value. Third, Florida tax assessors have never complied with
the law commanding assessment at "full cash value," and the Supreme
Court has consistently refused to enforce this law.8 9
Even with all these basic flaws in the yardstick prescribed, that
yardstick is seldom used. One hundred twenty Florida cities of varying size and general location were recently studied, with the following
result as regards debt limit: 90
70
3 ..
9-13
21
4

-- no limit
.. over 25%
21 through 25%
16 through 20%
11 through 15%
10% or under

87E.g., Dickey v. Fort Lauderdale, 136 Fla. 241, 186 So. 427 (1939) (true revenue

certificates); see also State v. Miami, 150 Fla. 270, 7 So.2d 146 (1942) (contract
creating obligation to pay certain current expense annually is not within statutory
prohibition if city has annual revenues sufficient to meet this and other current
expense). The correct meaning of "revenue certificate" is contrasted with the
Florida judicial definition in V, 4 infra under the subhead Motor Vehicle Parking.
SSE.g., Smith v. Milton, 61 Fla. 745, 54 So. 719 (1911).
89For a full discussion of FLA. CONsr. Art. X, §7 (excluding up to $5,000 of
assessed value of homestead realty from all taxation) and the action taken by
assessors and the bench in disregard of FLA. STAT. §193.11 (1951) (prescribing
assessment "each year" at "full cash value") see Crosby and Miller, Our Legal
Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Exemption: V, 2 U. or FLA. L. Rxv. 346
(1949), especially at 379-386.
9OSee KiLPATicK, op. cit.
supra note 85, at 96-97.
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Bonded debt far in excess of one hundred percent of assessed value
is not unknown in Florida municipal history; and as a practical matter
the only protection that the citizen has against being "improved"
right out of his home is insistence upon a definite and reasonable
bonded debt limit in the municipal charter, especially inasmuch as
our Supreme Court permits constant diversion of tax revenues from
municipal general funds by long-term pledge in the guise of what it
has chosen to call "revenue certificates" or "revenue bonds." Even a
bonded debt limit is no panacea, of course; the wise and frugal government espoused by Thomas Jefferson rests upon the constant vigilance of the citizens.
To return to the enumeration of standard general powers, every
municipality has police power by virtue of a series of provisions encompassing not only police surveillance in the narrow sense, municipal court jurisdiction5 ' and fire protection 92 but also numerous other
activities within the basically familiar yet vaguely delineated area of
health, safety and morals.

9

3

4. Special Problems Related to General Powers
Certain special problems as to powers of cities arise in Florida
because of the special efforts required of them in providing services
for tourists in addition to expanding their functions to meet the increasing demands made on all modem cities. These problems merit
specific mention. The powers themselves are frequently referred to
as special powers, but they acquired the term "special" simply because they were not common enough to be uniformly enjoyed through91FLA. STAT. §168.01 (1951) (police); FLA. CONST. Art. V, §§1, 34; FLA. STAT.
§§168.02-168.04 (1951) (municipal or "mayor's" court); see Fogle, Municipal Court

Practice,in this issue.

92
FLA. STAT. §§167.21 (broad authorization), 167.45 (special annual tax authoriized), 167.62-167.64 (2 shifts of firemen prescribed for cities of 15,000 or more)
(1951). See also §§167.51-167.56 (steam boiler inspection and licensing of stationary
steam engines in cities of over 5,000), 168.06 (power to regulate storage of gunpowder and military and naval stores), 168.10 (power to prohibit sale of fireworks).
93FA. STAT. §167.05 (1951) (power to prevent and abate nuisances and preserve
public health); see all of c. 168 (power to establish markets; to inspect and regulate
sales of fresh provisions, to license and regulate hotels, bars, theaters, and other
houses for public entertainment; to prohibit houses of ill fame and gambling; to
impound animals running at large; to prevent water pollution; and to penalize
sellers of liquor if city is in "dry" county); §§561.36, 561.44(l) as relating to
§§561.26, 561.34, Ragozzino v. Lake Maitland, 54 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1951) (upholding
refusal under ordinance to issue municipal retail liquor sale license in excess of
quota established, even though applicant had license from state beverage director).
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out the United States until recently or perhaps not even now. Once
granted by general law they are truly "general" powers in the state
granting them. They are here considered under the following headings: hospitals, recreation, advertising and public events, airports,
seaports, public housing, and motor vehicle parking.
Hospitals. Since 1935 Florida cities have been empowered by general law to construct, maintain and operate hospitals, 94 and even
prior to that date many cities had obtained this authority by special
act. A major problem created by this power is overlap with recognized county governmental functions; many counties have established
hospitals of their own.
Recreation. Recreational facilities in the form of playgrounds and
parks are familiar municipal services. So is the old town band that
most of us recall from boyhood days. This function has been largely
taken over by primary and secondary schools and by civic and fraternal organizations, with results somewhat less musical, especially in
the clarinet and baritone horn sections, but far more educational.
The blend is ended but the authority lingers on. 95
Florida cities usually maintain additional facilities for tourists and
residents. The Supreme Court has held that municipal authority to
maintain a park carries with it authority to maintain a bathing beach, 6
and since 1935 general law has added golf courses to the list of city
activities authorized.9 - The safe rule, however, is to list powers of

this type specifically in the charter. 98 Municipalities can make reasonable charges for recreational facilities and other services designed to
benefit the user individually and directly. 99
94FLA. STAT. §180.06(7) (1951).
Whether there is any significance in the fact
that the same powers were granted for golf courses at that time is left to golfing
readers.
95FL.. STAT. §167.67 (1951) (authorizing tax of not over 2 mills annually).
§167.68 wisely permits desubsidization of municipally financed outfits with more
enthusiasm than skill.
96Ide v. St. Cloud, 150 Fla. 806, 8 So.2d 924 (1942) (imposing tort liability
on city for death from drowning in deep hole in park lake maintained as public
bathing beach though not owned by city).
9
7See note 94 supra.
9sSeveral early decisions refused to authorize expenditures for golf courses
when the charter had no such provisions, e.g., Daytona Beach v. King, 152 Fla.
273, 181 So. 1 (1938); Bradentown [sic; today spelled "Bradenton"] v. State, 88
Fla. 381, 102 So. 556 (1924).
9
9See note 84 supra and text thereat.
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Advertising and Public Events. Special acts or special charter
provisions permit some cities to expend their funds for advertising
and for support of public events. 100 They accordingly purchase advertising in periodicals of national circulation, promote public events
such as conventions, and engage in other activities in aid of the tourist
industry. Powers of this nature are vital to the nation's playground
and should be specified in the charter.
Airports. The Airport Law of 1945,101 superseding the statute
passed sixteen years earlier,102 empowers our municipalities' 03
".... to acquire property, real or personal, for the purpose of
establishing, constructing and enlarging airports and other air
navigation facilities and to acquire, establish, construct, enlarge, improve, maintain, equip, operate and regulate such
airports and other air navigation facilities and structures and
other property incidental to their operation, either within or
without the territorial limits of such municipality and within
or without this state . .. ."
The city can lease this property and these facilities, or space or equipment thereon, to private parties, any municipal or state government,
the Federal Government, or any of their departments for operation
for a term not exceeding thirty years, and can sell any part thereof
to any of these public agencies. 04 It can also sell to anyone property
so acquired but not needed, and can grant concessions for furnishing
goods, facilities and services,10° including ground transportation of
07
passengers.' 0 6 The authority embraces airports on land or water.1
Other statutes provide comprehensive powers and procedural instructions for airport zoning l s and for airways and emergency landing
00
E.g., Charter §3 (8), in WVsr PALM IIEACH CrrY CODE (1948, unchanged
in Supp. 1951).
oFtA. STAT. c. 332 (1951).
1o21a. Laws 1929, c. 13569, §§1-4.
1o3FLA. STAT. §332.02 (1951). Property acquired by a municipality pursuant to
this chapter is tax exempt, §332.05.
104FLA. STAT. §332.08 (1951).

losIbid.

§§331.14, 331.15 (1951). Any such franchise may be exclusive.
§332.10 (1951).
'OSFLA. STAT. c. 333 (1951). See also §330.35 (collaboration with Florida State
Improvement Commission in zoning airport hazards).
1O-FLA. STAT.
07FLA. STAT.
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fields; °9 but municipalities are forbidden ". . . to collect a license or
registration fee or tax on any aircraft or glider in this state."110 As regards the nature of the airport operation function, the Supreme Court
has declared it proprietary rather than governmental, at least when
the airport is used commercially in whole or in part.""
Seaports. Harbor facilities are of obvious importance in most
coastal cities; and municipal authorization by general law to construct
wharves, quays and docks, to regulate mooring and anchorage of
vessels within the corporate limits, and to establish ferries dates at
least from 1869.112 This field of activity also includes authority to
3
construct yacht basins."

Public Housing. Broad authority has been granted to cities of
over twenty-five hundred to undertake nonprofit public housing and
defense housing projects pursuant to detailed statutory provisions'"
empowering the city to take any real property by eminent domain,""
to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any of its property,"86 to enjoy
exemption from all nonfederal taxes and even special assessments," 7
to hold all such realty free from execution," 8 to issue tax-free debentures,"19 and to bargain away local control in return for federal
109FLA. STAT. c. 331 (1951).
"l0FLA. STAT. §330.17 (1951).

"11Peavey v. Miami, 146 Fla. 629, 1 So.2d 614 (1941).
112Fla. Laws 1869, c. 1688, §15, now FLA. STAT. §167.21 (1951). Oddly enough
FLA. CONsT. Art. III, §20 forbids special or local laws for establishing ferries.
113State v. Clearwater, 135 Fla. 148, 184 So. 790 (1938); see FLA, STAT. §167.73 (2)
(1951), enacted in 1943, expressly authorizing a charge for the use thereof.
'l4The Housing Authorities Law (1937, later amended) appears in FLA. STAT.
§§421.01-421.26 (1951), the Rural Housing Authorities Law of Florida (1941) in
§§421.27-421.36 (for counties only), and the defense housing provisions in
§§421.37-421.51. The chapter ends, §421.52, with a 1943 curative provision covering
action taken under the first two statutes named above. See also c. 422, the 1937
Housing Cooperation Law, directing each city to appropriate out of its general
funds amounts sufficient to meet the administrative expenses and overhead of its
housing authority and authorizing it to loan or donate money thereto, and authorizing any state public body to exercise broad cooperative powers with or
without consideration.
"15FLA. STAT. §§421.08 (4), 421.12 (1951).
116FL.A. STAT. §421.08(4) (1951). But see notes 123, 124 infra and text thereat.
"17FLA. STAT. §423.02 (1951).
318FLA. STAT. §421.20 (1951).
'19FLA. STAT. §§421.14, 423.03 (1951); see also §§412.15-421.19. These debentures

are closely akin to revenue certificates properly so called, although the housing
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aid. 120 All city housing projects are subject to its planning, zoning,
12 1
sanitary and building regulations.
Municipal construction and operation of these projects via a public
1 22
housing authority has been upheld as a legitimate public function;
2
3
but Adams v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach has recently
branded as unconstitutional the condemnation of private property,
as part of a broad slum clearance and public housing plan, for disposition of one area of the project to private owners for exclusively
industrial and commercial use and personal profit. 24 The city tied
in this slum clearance scheme with low-cost housing by constructing
in another area, zoned as residential, a project comprising one hundred
dwellings for which fifty-two of the sixty families to be displaced by
the challenged clearance would be financially eligible12 The area
to be condemned was, however, expressly zoned for industry and
commerce; residences in it were prohibited. The opinion concedes
that construction of low-cost housing is a public purpose justifying
the exercise of eminent domain, and that incidental disposition to
private persons of small unneeded portions of the property so acquired
authority can pledge its (not the city's) general funds too.
§421.21 (1951).
121FL.. STAT. §421.13 (1951).
122Lott v. Orlando, 142 Fla. 338, 196 So. 313 (1939) (upholding city construction of low-cost housing for Negro families, outside city limits, with city obligated to furnish housing authority with municipal services, facilities, and streets
for tenants without cost to other inhabitants of city); Marvin v. Housing Authority
of Jacksonville, 133 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145 (1938) (upholding city-owned low-cost
120FLA. STAT.

housing project, exempt from all ad valorem taxation and financed by an issue
of 60-year debentures, to be purchased 90% by FHA and 10% by private investors, secured by pledge of rents and other income from project plus small
FHA grant; no freeholder vote).
12360 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1952). Opinion by Mathews, J., with 4 justices concurring
and Terrell, J., dissenting.

124 Contravening FL4. CoNsr. Ded. of Rights §1 (equality before law to acquire,
possess, and protect property), §12 (due process and just compensation for seizure
of private property); Art. IX, §§5, 10 (no municipal tax revenues, appropriations,

or pledge of credit for private party); Art. XVI, §29 (no appropriation of private
property or right of way to use of any corporation or individual until full compensation, set by jury of 12 men, is made to owner or secured by deposit of money).
The Redevelopment Plan under attack authorized determination of fair value by
independent appraisals by two qualified local appraisers.
125Adams v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach, 60 So.2d 663, 667 (Fla.

1952). The majority quotes this provision and then supplies, from somewhere out
of the blue, its own notion that there is no connection between the two projects.
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would be permissible.126 The flaw in the Redevelopment Plan, according to the majority, lay in combining, even though done in accordance with the city general zoning plan, two projects of which one
contemplated housing and the other proposed both disposition to
private persons and use for purposes exclusively industrial or commercial.

2

7

If we accept the premise that the housing under construction had
in fact no relation to this second proposed developmentl2s the propriety of employing the method adopted in order to make the area
useful still faces us. On this score the majority obviously fears that
the judiciary cannot effectively draw a line if it once sanctions any
public seizure for private industrial use, and that abuse of the power
will get out of hand. 29
The opinion fails to consider seizure of property by eminent domain for use at a profit as a privately owned railroad or power plant,
but some comparison should be of assistance. One distinction is that
these industries have long been recognized in our society as public
utilities, as enterprises requiring total or partial monopoly and the
power of eminent domain, whereas most other forms of industry and
commerce have not been so classified in a type of government based
on private enterprise and competition regulated to varying extents. 3
On the other hand, railroads and power plants do not confine their
condemnations to slums and blighted areas; they not infrequently
take, and unavoidably ruin, good residential or shopping districts.
The majority regards the police power as adequate to cope with
the situation; in other words, a combination of zoning mandates prohibiting further residential use, coupled with standard assessments
and annual ad valorem taxes, can effectively force either private sale
or conversion to the assigned uses, the alternative being heavy and
continued financial loss to the current owner.131 The position of
1261d. at 665, 667. The statements are not made affirmatively, but the implication is obvious.
12Tld. at 667.
1281d. at 667, 668; see also note 125 supra.
'291d, at 668, 669.
1SOBusinesses "affected with a public interest," even though enjoying none of
the advantages of public utilities, can nevertheless be very strictly regulated, e.g.,
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). No one has to date stated precisely, however, just what factors "affect" a normal business with a "public interest."
'SlAdams v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach, 60 So.2d 663, 666 (Fla.
1952), citing as an example of police power effectivity the extreme reached in
Standard Oil Co. v. Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950), a highly questionable
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Mr. Justice Terrell, dissenting, is that choosing between employment
of police power, with its lack of any reimbursement for resulting loss
of income, and eminent domain, with its constitutionally prescribed
fair compensation, is properly a prerogative of our Legislature, whose
finding of public necessity, if it means anything in the one instance,
means just as much in the other.132 He is not convinced that slum
clearance, whenever dependent on use by private industry of a substantial area of the property condemned in the overall project, loses
its public character and reliance on the power of eminent domain.
The practical effect of the Adams decision is that wherever dilapidated residences are town down, pursuant to eminent domain proceedings, either low-cost housing alone must go up or some publicly
owned facility must be constructed. Overall zoning plans have suffered a major blow in this almost unique Florida holding. 133 Furthermore the opinion strongly implies that any new housing facilities
must be publicly owned, at least from a legal standpoint, and publicly
operated.

1 34

The majority professes to take up the cudgels in defense of the
private enterprise system. 135 The ironic twist is, however, that in
practice the result is quite the opposite. As in Marvin v. Housing
3
Authority of Jacksonville,1
6 a municipality without ready cash-

and few if any enjoy large reserve funds-must borrow the money.
The prodigal dispenser is the Federal Government, which not only
imposes its own controls in lieu of local law as a part of the contract
but also gets its funds by means of high taxes, social security payments, and other contributions forced from those very businessmen
that Adams purports to protect against governmental intrusion into
private enterprise.
From another angle, the decision poses a further serious practical
problem, namely, is strict circumscription of the power of eminent
2-1 decision permitting the city first to authorize construction of a filling station
and, shortly after construction, to change its mind and forbid operation without
one cent of compensation to the owner for the substantial loss forced upon it.
132Adams v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach, 60 So.2d 663, 671-672 (Fla.
1952).
133Id. at 672. The great weight of authority on the same constitutional issues
is contra; see Fordham, The Challenge of Contemporary Urban Problems nn. 17-28
and discussion thereat, in the opening article in this issue.
234Adams v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach, 60 So.2d 663, 667-668 (Fla.
1952).
'351d. at 668-669.
2ISummarized in note 122 supra.
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domain worth the price set by the Court in Florida? That price, for
the city, is continuance of blighted areas that lower values of adjacent property and yet are legally immunized by the Court against
all private development, plus heavy loss of tax revenue unless the
property is assessed at what its value should be if properly utilized,
and in addition the serious crippling if not virtual elimination of
intelligent long-range zoning plans. For the individual owners, including the many that desire to join hands in cleaning up filth and
slums, the price is heavy-handed wielding of the police power and
restriction of all to the pace set by the most backward owner in the
area, with substantial loss of income to every owner in it. The police
power approach is typically judicial, lengthy and negative rather than
positive. No Florida city has as yet felt keenly the stranglehold of
expanding slums, but the plight of New York City presents a preview
137
of what can happen here if our bench forces Florida to sit and wait.
'37The acuteness of the problem is presented in a recent authoritative report
by experts in the various fields of knowledge involved. This is ably summarized in
N.Y. Herald Tribune, Aug. 31, 1953, p. 1, col. 4, which is accordingly quoted at
some length:
"Frederick H. Allen, president of Harrison, Ballard & Allen, Inc., city
planning consultants, a member of the committee, explained-that 'middle
and upper income groups' means families paying rent of $19 or more a
room a month and with an annual income of $4,500 or more.
"The statement was signed by Louis Pink, president of the United
Housing Foundation and former chairman of Associated Hospital Service;
Peter Grimm, board chairman of William A. White Co., realtors; Edwin
S. Burdell, president of Cooper Union; Robert W. Dowling, president of
City Investing Co.; Paul Windels, former Corporation Counsel of New
York; Earl B. Schwulst, president of the Bowery Savings Bank, and Mr.
Allen.
"Their report said: 'In the past decade, New York has lost more than
half a million persons in the middle and upper income groups. Many of
these people have relocated in suburban counties, either commuting to
their New York jobs or finding new employment outside of New York
City. At the same time, New York has acquired a slightly higher number
of newcomers in the lower income brackets. The impact on the economy
of the city is obvious, and the racial problems linked to housing have been
sharply increased.'
"Quarters for housing families dislocated in slum-clearance projects are
inadequate, and the city's 50,000 old-law tenements cannot be wiped out
and replaced by subsidized modem elevator apartments 'without an
unbearable increase' in the tax load.
"'New York City is competing not only in housing, but in employment
opportunity and community living with its suburban areas. Better schools,
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Motor Vehicle Parking. The pressing modem problem of automobile parking in downtown areas led in 1951 to general legislation
conferring upon any municipality additional powers to construct,
equip, maintain and operate parking facilities and install parking
meters.138 Permissible facilities include lots and terminals or other structures, which may be multilevel and above or below surface, as well
as waiting rooms and lockers; and the nature of the structures may
take into account use by trucks and busses."39 The municipality can
acquire lands and rights for parking facility purposes by eminent
domain, can lease them in whole or in part for any term,140 and can
charge for the services rendered. 14 1 The property is exempt from all
1 42
taxation within the state and even from assessments.
The project can be financed by "revenue bonds" secured by pledge
of parking facility and meter revenues.' 4 3 Indeed, the ordinance authorizing issuance may contain not only regulations regarding use and
operation of the facilities but also'4
"... provisions regulating one-way traffic and limiting or prohibiting the parking of motor vehicles on the streets . . . and
such provisions shall be deemed to constitute a part of the contract between the municipality and the holders of bonds . . .
and, except as otherwise provided in such ordinance, shall be
irrepealable while any of such bonds shall be outstanding and
unpaid."
This freezing, by contract with private parties, of municipal authority
to control traffic, heretofore traditionally a governmental rather than
proprietary function, marks a radical shift in Florida law. So, under
better playground and recreation facilities, convenient local shopping, ability
to use and store private automobiles and a more personal stake in local
affairs must be recognized as some of the things people now look for when
they seek better housing.'
"No significant progress can be made without encouraging private enterprise to do more in building new and renovating old housing."
138FLA. STAT. C. 183 (1951), enacted as Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26918.
139FLA. STAT. §183.02(3) (1951).
140FLA. STAT. §183.03 (5),(6) (1951).
'4dFLA. STAT. §183.03 (3) (1951).
142FLA. STAT.

§183.14 (1951).

'43FLA. STAT. §§183.04-183.10 (1951).
144FLA. STAT. §183.11 (1951).
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the Adams decision,145 will any attempt to lease all the facilities to a
private party for his operation and commercial gain.
The July 10 decision in Gate City Garage,Inc. v. Jacksonville,146
validating a city bond issue proposed by ordinance under the authority
of special acts' 47 similar in many respects to the 1951 general statute
here summarized, merits close scrutiny. It confirms the familiar
principles that our Legislature is the fountainhead of all municipal
power, that traffic regulation is a public function, that government
competition with private business is not forbidden by the Florida
Constitution if for a purpose declared public by the Legislature with
judicial approval, and that the incidental lease to a private party
of a portion of a facility not needed or the grant of a concession thereon to serve the public convenience does not vitiate the propriety of
eminent domain in acquiring the facility. It also endorses the contentions that off-street parking is a part of such regulation and that
on-street and off-street parking are closely related and can be combined in one plan. The opinion points out, however, that "....

there

is no legislative authority to sell the land in question or to lease the
entire property to some private individual or corporation for private
gain,"'14 and that the language in the ordinance forbidding sale or
lease of the parking facility otherwise than as a whole is merely a
contractual limitation on partial disposition and does not constitute
authority to dispose of the facility at all.
The Court will have difficulty in permitting total or substantial
disposition to private parties 49 without reversing the tenor of the
Adams opinion; 150 in both instances private gain is achieved as the
ultimate result by the exercise of eminent domain via the city as
'45Adams v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach, 60 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1952),
discussed V, 4 supra under Public Housing.
14666 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1953), a 5-2 decision with opinion by Mathews, J., joined
by Roberts, c.J., Hobson and Drew, JJ., and Holt, Assc. J., and a well-reasoned
dissenting opinion by Parks, Assc. J., joined by Terrell, J. The two circuit judges
sat as associates in the places of Thomas and Sebring, JJ.
147Fla. Spec. Acts 1947, c. 24611, as amended, Fla. Spec. Acts 1951, c. 27635.
'sGate City Garage, Inc. v. Jacksonville, 66 So.2d 653, 659 (Fla. 1953).
The quotation obviously refers to the special act alone; it overlooks the additional
general law power of every city to lease all or part of its parking facilities for
any term, FLA. STAT. §185.03 (6) (1951). The Adams decision throws serious doubt
on the constitutionality of this provision, however; see notes 128-185 supra.
149Unless, of course, the public need for the project and its facilities has been
removed by obsolescence, change in customs, or some other corresponding factor.
150See notes 123-135 supra.
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straw-man, and certainly housing human beings properly is at least
as important as "housing" vehicles. Adams can, however, be technically
distinguished if the Court later takes a definite position and condemns
industrial as distinct from housing use, rather than transfer to new
private owners, as the real vice. It can also stress its holdings that
in Adams the two subdivisions of the Redevelopment Plan were
separate and distinct while in Gate City a parking lot formed an
integral part of existing and future parking meters scattered around
the city, although no valid basis for this differentiation has as yet
appeared.251
The clearest issue in the case is the validity of the pledge of municipal credit without freeholder vote; 152 and any determination of
this issue necessarily swings on the nature of the pledge.
In view of the hopeless confusion in the law of Florida as to what
a revenue certificate is, some explanation is long overdue. To anyone
experienced in finance and familiar with its terminology a revenue
certificate is an obligation secured by pledge of the net income of the
facility acquired, constructed, enlarged or repaired with the proceeds
of the loan. Operating and maintenance expenses are deducted from
gross income before the net is reached, and a self-sustaining facility
is always contemplated. The security does not include a lien on physical plant and equipment, and a fortiori it does not include a pledge
of general credit or tax proceeds, especially when the sources of these
are independent of the facility.
The Florida Supreme Court in earlier days recognized these
principles.lss Gradually, however, in a rambling process skillfully
15What the Court overlooks is that parking one's car near the office or the
shopping center is not the only or even the primary factor in selecting a place
to live. No responsible parent wants to rear his family alongside industrial plants
and railroad tracks; and conversely no industrialist welcomes the moral and
financial hazards of having uncared for, and in many instances unwanted, youngsters swarming around his machinery and other equipment. All laymen, and
most jurists, realize as a matter of common sense that the two do not belong together.
152Due process, state and federal, is also an issue, inasmuch as the property
of a private party engaged in uncriticized operation of an allegedly needed
facility is being seized by the city through eminent domain for the very same
purpose and, unless the ordinance is invalid, can be turned over to another private
party to operate for his own profit.
l53See, e.g., the able and correct exposition by Davis, J., in Boykin v. River
Junction, 121 Fla. 902, 907-911, 164 So. 558, 560-562 (1985), approving the analysis
in State v. Miami, 113 Fla. 280, 288-297, 152 So. 6, 9-12 (1933).
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traced by Patterson in this issue,154 it gravitated through various stages
to the unique Florida definition of a revenue certificate as an obligation secured by pledge of tax proceeds along with net income,
although this earmarking and siphoning off of the revenues from almost all types of taxes obviously depletes the residue, or general funds,
as a matter of elementary economics. As a result the freeholders alone
are left to keep the general funds supplied by ad valorem taxes
with whatever is necessary to run the municipality for the benefit of
those enjoying a free ride. The Constitution specifically forbids any
pledge of the freeholders' credit without their consent; and the need
for the 1930 amendment is or should be apparent to all that have
witnessed the dreaming, scheming and profligate spending on the
credit of someone else indulged in during a "boom."' 15 5 In any event,
change in this provision, if the people of Florida desire one, should
be effected by amendment-not by the bench.
The Court has now reached a new high in Gate City;156 taken at
face value this decision means that a municipality can today constitutionally surrender its police power by private contract and can
pledge its general funds by covenanting to operate police power
facilities after pledging their gross income - all without freeholder
vote. The only move remaining in the judicial repeal of Article IX,
Section 6 of our Constitution is financially a minor one, namely, the
pledging of general funds and ad valorem taxing power in one forthright step rather than in two.
Specifically, the security in Gate City consists of the net revenue
from the proposed off-street parking facility and the gross revenue
from existing and future on-street parking. The city in one breath
disclaims any liability out of its general funds and yet in another
promises to complete the parking lot construction, to maintain it
in good condition and operate it efficiently, and to maintain, operate
and charge for the use of its parking meters while diverting every
cent of income from them to any extent needed to meet bond amorti154Legal Aspects of Florida Municipal Bond Financing.
55
2 FLA. CONST. Art. IX, §6, quoted in text at end of this part V. Note the

contemporaneous explanation to this effect given by Brown, J., for a unanimous
Court in Sullivan v. Tampa, 101 Fla. 298, 314, 134 So. 211, 217 (1931). For a
similar explanation by Mathews, J., only one year before his reversal of position
in Gate City, see State v. Florida State Imp'vt Comm'n, 60 So.2d 747, 750-752
(1952), especially his condemnation of any "scheme" to transfer money of ad
valorem taxpayers to bondholders without freeholder vote, id. at 754.
156 Gate City Garage, Inc. v. Jacksonville, 66 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1953).
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zation and any additional construction costs. The special act even
authorizes the pledge of city general funds, but the city did not find
a direct pledge of these necessary; instead it siphons its general funds,
masquerading as parking meter operation and maintenance expenses
paid from these funds, into bond security by pledging the gross, not
just the net, parking meter revenues.
Furthermore the city freezes its present and future police power,
a strictly governmental function, by contract with private individuals.
The Court squarely categorizes parking meter operation as an exercise
of police power. 5 7 Only a few months earlier, in State v. Miami,1 5
it flatly forbade the pledge, without freeholder approval, of general
funds accruing from exercise of the city police power in the form of
proceeds from municipal court fines and forfeitures, yet it does not
expressly overrule that decision in Gate City. It flatly ruled in Panama
City v. State, less than a year before deciding Gate City, that'5 9
"....

Panama City cannot by contract tie its hands and bind itself in

such manner as to relinquish for a long, possibly indefinite, period of
time its sovereign right and duty under the police power to regulate
traffic." Mr. Justice Mathews, who wrote the Adams and Gate City
Garage opinions, concurred in the opinion by Mr. Justice Hobson,
who concurred with Mr. Justice Mathews in the other two cases; and
both joined Mr. Justice Terrell in State v. Miami. Furthermore, in
Panama City the invalidated pledge reached only the "excess parking
meter revenues."' 160 that is, the net rather than the gross. The Gate

City opinion struggles manfully to get around the Panama City
decision by holding that increasing the number of lanes and the speed
of moving traffic by widening, repairing and otherwise improving
1571d, at 656-657.

'1563 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1953), Sebring and Roberts, JJ., dissenting (holding invalid the proposed pledge of city fine and forfeiture fund to finance construction
of a city stockade in aid of police department). Violation of FLA. CONST. Art. IX, §6
was specifically assigned in the opinion by Terrell, J., who quite logically dissented
in Gate City.
15860 So.2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1952), a 4-1 decision with opinion by Hobson, J.,
joined by Sebring, CJ., and Thomas and Mathews, JJ., and with dissent by
Terrell, J.; accord, Chase v. City of Sanford, 54 So.2d 370 (Fla. 1951) (holding
invalid the proposed pledge of net port terminal and net parking meter revenues
to service issue of bonds for construction and operation of port terminal facilities;
no freeholder vote; police power over parking meters frozen by bond contract).
18060 So.2d 658; the annual net amount, as stated at 659, was $27,000. In Gate
City the Jacksonville annual gross parking meter revenue was approximately
$90,000, half of which was consumed for operation and maintenance.
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the streets is not a remedy for congestion under the police power
but that doing the same thing by moving parked cars off the street
and into parking lots does relieve congestion.'-' The distinction is,
to say the least, somewhat nebulous.
As a result of these decisions the third and either the first or
second of these conclusions is logically inescapable today:
(1) The police power can now be exercised for profit and its
future course bargained away irrevocably for many years by
private contract.
(2) Parking meter operation is no longer within the police power
but is instead a proprietary function, and use of the public
thoroughfares warrants a charge as a special service to each
user.
(3) General funds can be pledged if the maneuver is adroitly executed in two steps rather than in one; and a carefully drafted
limitation clearly expressed in our Constitution stands repealed by a stroke of the judicial pen, specifically the unequivocal mandate that162 ". . . Municipalities of the State of
Florida shall have power to issue bonds only after the same
shall have been approved by a majority of the votes cast in
an election in which a majority of the freeholders who are
qualified electors residing in such . . . Municipalities shall
participate .
"
One can confidently predict, of course, that the Court will not
openly endorse any of these results. Instead, at least one of these decisions will be distinguished without any difference or will be simply
overlooked.' 63 The practitioner, however, enjoys neither method of
escape. In this particular field our Supreme Court has turned out,
from a ratio standpoint, more opinions and less law than in any
16lGate City Garage, Inc. v. Jacksonville, 66 So.2d 653, 657 (Fla. 1953). Conversely, the Court stated recently, expressly and unanimously in Chase v. City of
Sanford, 54 So.2d 370, 372 (Fla. 1951), that paving streets is related to traffic
regulation. The Panama City judgment can properly be sustained on one of the
grounds given in that opinion, namely, that street improvement is not a revenueproducing undertaking and hence falls outside the statute offered as the source
of authority; but the alternative holding advanced in the opinion is the unconstitutionality of freezing police power by contract.
162FLA. CONST. Art. IX, §6; see notes 153-156 supra and text thereat.
163Two illustrations of what this prediction is based on appear in notes 210214 and 236-241 infra and the text thereat.
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other. The constitutional or financial lawyer cannot with any confidence advise his clients as to what the law is; he can merely relate,
after the next decision, what it was for a time.,64
VI. ExPANsioN AND ANNEXATION

In a rapidly growing state, expansion of urban communities is
inevitable. Human interest factors make annexation a highly complicated field from the legal standpoint, especially when this procedure is considered in connection with the numerous types of intercity agreements. The notorious Florida real estate boom, followed
by the depression of the late 'twenties and early 'thirties, evoked a
veritable bombardment of our judiciary with old and new legal
missiles. Adequate analysis of its rulings in this battle of overgrown
amoebas demands a lengthy article- yet to be written by someone.
Such an undertaking should cover initial boundaries, annexation, and
intercity agreements, as well as the niceties of procedure in these areas
raised by successful and unsuccessful attempts to resort to quo warranto, injunction, mandamus, and bond validation skirmishes. The
task entails tracing the trends gradually forming among several hundred cases, including the running battle between those two giants
of Florida municipal law, Armstead Brown and James B. Whitfield. 165
Two procedures are available for annexation of areas adjacent to
Florida cities: (1) favorable vote by residents both of the annexing
city and of the area to be annexed 1 66 and (2) special legislation, with
or without -referendum approval. This second procedure, however,
l64This confused wavering stands out the more because it is not at all typical
of the trend-building of the Florida Supreme Court in most fields.
lMEach served for many years on the Supreme Court, as justice and chief
justice. Their struggles extended through the bases of de facto jurisdiction, the
grounds for invoking estoppel or laches, the propriety of quo warranto as against
injunction, and the legislative power under FL4. CONsT. Art. VIII, §8 as against
powers inherent in the very nature of local government. Crystallization of the
law lay at the end of a long and tortuous road, and in some respects the end is
not yet in sight.
166F.A. STAT. C. 171 (1951). City limits may also be contracted, §§171.01, 171.03;
and any landowner or 3/4 of the electors (presumably; the statute is very poorly
drafted) in towns of under 150 qualified electors may petition the circuit court
for exclusion of their area if the lands are shown to be "virtually or commensurately excluded from the benefits of such municipal organization," §171.02,
Ocoee v. West, 102 Fla. 277, 130 So. 9 (1930); cf. McCombs v. West, 155 F.2d 601
(5th Cir. 1946). For the decidedly different procedure by resort to quo warranto
see notes 41, 42 supra and 183 infra.
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if once used excludes all general law methods; if the boundaries are
at any time fixed by special act, then only a later special act or action
expressly authorized thereby may change them, and no general law
1 7
authority to enlarge boundaries is applicable.
The Court has recently clarified the law in the excellent opinion
by Mr. Justice Sebring in Ocoee v. Browness,168 overruling conflicting
implications. The Legislature can, by special as distinct from general
statute, not only redefine boundaries itself, subject to organic limitations, but also authorize the municipality to take such action in a
specified manner. The authorization must, however, be "specifically
granted." 69 The philosophy is sound; if the Legislature decides that
a designated municipality is capable of working out the details of
expansion in a specified manner there is no reason why the Legislature should be barred from granting this authority and thereby
forced to formulate all details in the statute in order to act at all. The
decision still leaves the Legislature free to withdraw any grant by
subsequent special act or to nullify de jure its exercise if unsatisfactory;
and of course the usual constitutional limitations apply to any purported exercise. As a practical matter this decision marks a significant
step towards local determinations for any municipality that by special
act secures an amendment of this type to its charter.
1. GeneralLaw Annexation by Vote
Four separate types of procedure are recognized by general law
for extension of city limits into adjacent territory when general law
provisions are applicable at all. The first two relate to expansion
into unincorporated tracts; the third relates to annexation of either
incorporated or unincorporated territory; and the fourth governs
annexation of one municipality by another. The first three hinge on
a confused statutory attempt at classification by population.
Tracts with Less than Ten Registered Voters. When the adjacent
tract cannot boast even ten registered voters the council of the annex167E.g., Beaty v. Inlet Beach, Inc., 151 Fla. 495, 9 So.2d 735 (1942); State ex tel.
Davis v. Homestead, 100 Fla. 354, 130 So. 28, aff'd on rehearing with opinion, 100
Fla. 361, 130 So. 32 (1930).
16865 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1953), a 5-2 decision with Thomas and Hobson, JJ., dissenting without opinion. This answers definitely the question recognized but left
unanswered as not necessary to the decision in State ex tel. Landis v. Hollywood,
130 Fla. 364, 178 So. 412 (1937).
16965 So.2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1953).
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ing city enacts an ordinance announcing the annexation, which,
failing objection, becomes effective in thirty days. The ordinance
must be published once a week for four consecutive weeks in a newspaper published in the town or city, or, if no paper is published, three
printed copies must be posted for four consecutive weeks at some
conspicuous place in the city or town and at three conspicuous places
in the district to be annexed. Ten or more registered voters of the
municipality, or two or more realty owners in the district to be annexed, can object by filing in the circuit court a petition setting forth
their grounds for objection. Further action is thereupon stayed until
hearing, after which the court may approve or disapprove the proposed annexation. 170
Tracts with Ten through Ten Thousand Registered Voters. If
the tract of land to be annexed has from ten through ten thousand
registered voters separate elections must follow passage of the ordinance of annexation; the votes in the city and in the territory to be
annexed must be counted separately; and two thirds of those actually
7
voting "in said district and in said city or town" must approve.' '
Cities of Over Ten Thousand Inhabitants. For cities of over ten
thousand inhabitants the adjacent territory may be either incorporated
or unincorporated, and the requirements for tallying the results are
easier to meet; approval of the ordinance requires merely two thirds
of the total votes cast in a special election.172 A common drafting
error is well illustrated by these provisions. The character of the
bracket jumps from "registered voters" of the tract to be annexed to
"inhabitants" of the annexing city. The inconsistency is obvious.
Presumably this later statute would govern in the event of conflict,
and the few hapless rural landowners wanted as taxpayers by a prodigal
municipality would be relegated to the precarious remedy of litiga1 3
tion after being easily outvoted. 7
Annexation of One Municipality by Another. A municipality
desiring to annex another simply passes an ordinance expressing this
desire and transmits it to the mayor of the other municipality for
170FLA. STAT. §171.04 (1951),

enacted as Fla. Laws 1869, c. 1688, and amended

in 1879.
1711bid.

§171.05 (1951), enacted as Fla. Laws 1905, c. 5464.
"'1The Florida judiciary has consistently been solicitous in protecting the interests of bondholders as against ad valorem taxpayers. Proof of no "prospective"
benefits is difficult in the extreme.
272FLA. STAT.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol6/iss3/7

40

Miller and Dauer: Municipal Charters in Florida: Law and Drafting
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
council acceptance of the proposal. If the reaction is favorable the
marriage is consummated by the approval of two thirds of those ac74
tually voting in each municipality at separate elections.1
2. Special Act Annexation
Inasmuch as any extension of boundaries once set or authorized
by special act must be pursued in the same manner this procedure
is ordinarily employed in Florida. Boundary extension provisions
incorporated expressly or by reference in a charter adopted under
general law procedure cannot override later or earlier annexation by
special act; 17 5 but authority granted by special act, once it appears
in the charter, can be freely exercised as long as the action taken remains within constitutional bounds and the authority is not plainly
superseded by a later general or special statute. 7 6 Referendum is not
required in special act procedure if the alternative notice specified
in the Constitution is given. 1 77 An excellent recent illustration of
this procedure is the acquisition by Tampa of some eighty thousand
new inhabitants pursuant to special act duly advertised in advance
of its introduction as a bill.'y 8 Two earlier attempts by referendum
had failed;179 but the Hillsborough County candidates for the 1953
Legislature openly advocated a third attempt in their election campaigns, so the public was well informed. 80
3. Basic Limitations on Annexation
All annexation is subject to a number of limitations, which resemble rather closely those applicable to establishment of boundaries
74FLA. STAT. §171.09 (1951).

175Klich v. Miami Land and Devel. Co., 139 Fla. 794, 191 So. 41 (1939); State
ex rel. Davis v. Homestead, 100 Fla. 354, 130 So. 28, aff'd on rehearingwith opinion,
100 Fla. 361, 130 So. 32 (1930).
176See

notes 167-169 supra.

177State ex rel. Davis v. Clearwater, 106 Fla. 761, 139 So. 377 (1931), reaff'd on
rehearingfollowing vacating of original affirmance, 108 Fla. 635, 146 So. 836 (1933)
(Fla. Spec. Acts 1925, c. 10394, having been enacted without referendum); State v.
Miami, 103 Fla. 54, 137 So. 261 (1931); cf. Nabb v. Andreu, 89 Fla. 414, 104 So.
591 (1925). See II, 1 supra in regard to notice today and the evolution of the
constitutional mandates.
17sPassed as Fla. Spec. Acts 1953, c. 29548.
3791n 1947 and 1951.
8
OSee Tampa Morning Tribune, April 28, 1953, p. 1, col. 1. The special bill
passed the House and Senate in one day on April 27, and was approved by the

Governor on April 28.
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initially.181 The services must of course be available, and the territory annexed must not be so sparsely settled or so extensive as to be
82
unsuited to city services.
The state can attack invalid annexation in quo warranto proceedings if public rights are adversely affected; 8 3 and landowners in the
area can use this remedy today even if the attorney general refuses
to join them.111 Accordingly they should employ it more widely,
although in former times they frequently resorted to injunction. 8 5
Perhaps they can still do so to test the legality of attempted taxation
of their property by a purported municipality lacking both de jure
and de facto jurisdiction; Farringtonv. Flood8 8 so holds and has not
been questioned, although it antedates the latest extension of the
use of quo warranto.' 8 ' Logically, of course, quo warranto should
lie to check any unauthorized exercise of a municipal franchise, but
the Court might still sanction injunctive relief. A more likely use of
injunction even today is challenging a tax levy imposed to meet bonded
debt incurred during alleged de facto jurisdiction of the municipality
prior to its ouster from the land of the complainant.'13
l81See IV supra.
182E.g., State ex rel. Ervin v. Oakland Park, 42 So.2d 270 (Fla. 1949); State
ex rel. Landis v. Boca Raton, 129 Fla. 673, 177 So. 293 (1937); State ex rel. Att'y
Gen. v. Avon Park, 108 Fla. 641, 149 So. 409 (1933), modified on proceduralgrounds
so as to afford relief, 117 Fla. 565, 158 So. 159 (1934).
' 8 3Statc ex rel. Landis v. Winter Haven, 114 Fla. 199, 154 So. 700 (1934); State
ex rel. Davis v. Pompano, 113 Fla. 246, 151 So. 485 (1933). But if no affected
landowner complains the attorney general has no standing to file quo warranto
by himself, alleging merely that any annexation of rural lands is per se contrary
to the public interest, State ex rel. Johnson v. Sarasota, 92 Fla. 563, 109 So. 473
(1926). For the federal view see Morin v. City of Stuart, 111 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.
1940); federal courts lack quo warranto jurisdiction and are loath to issue an
injunction in view of the confused state of the law in Florida on the propriety of
this remedy.
'8 4See notes 41, 42 supra.
's8See, e.g., Durham v. Pentucket Groves, 138 Fla. 386, 189 So. 428 (1939);
Sarasota v. Skillin, 130 Fla. 724, 178 So. 837 (1937). The dissent of Brown, J.,
sharpens the issue.
'5640 So.2d 462 (Fla., May 3, 1949); accord, Bass v. Addison, 40 So.2d 466 (Fla.,
May 3, 1949).
187See note 41 supra. FLA. STAT. §165.30
(1951), however, specifies challenge
to "the validity of the municipal corporation wherein such lands are located, and
the legal existence of its corporate franchises." It became law without the
Governor's signature on June 13, 1949.
'88For such use see Winter Haven v. A. M. Klemm & Son, 132 Fla. 334, 181 So.
153 (1938).
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The aggrieved landowner cannot safely sleep on his rights, however; long delay, acquiesence, or acceptance of benefits will normally
support a defense based on laches, estoppel, or both.8 9 The Court
has refused to indicate in advance the precise types of factual situations that give rise to laches or estoppel - and rightly so.190 It has,
of course, dearly set forth the basic legal characteristics of estoppel'0 1
as distinct from laches; but decision patterns cannot feasibly be
formalized in areas depending largely on the equities of individual
situations involving in each separate instance a dissimilar fact quantum
and a relativity of weight that varies widely as the facts vary. 92 In
these areas judgments ad hoc, with little assistance from precedents,
are to be expected.
Even when expansion is ultimately voided the municipality may
have de facto jurisdiction during the period of dispute.193 In instances of valid expansion the annexing municipality acquires all
public property, rights and franchises of the city or territory annexed
94
and in turn becomes liable for all its public debts and obligations.
'89E.g., General Properties Co. v. Rellim Inv. Co., 151 Fla. 136, 9 So.2d 295
(1942) (15 years' delay in seeking relief held fatal); Lake Maitland v. State ex rel.
Landis, 127 Fla. 653, 173 So. 677 (1937) (1937 attack on annexation confirmed by
Legislature in 1909 held too late); State ex rel. Landis v. Coral Gables, 120 Fla.
492, 163 So. 308 (1935) (laches); State ex rel. Davis v. Clearwater, 106 Fla. 761,
139 So. 377 (1932) (estoppel by accepting benefits from proceeds of bond issue).
But see, for results that appear at first glance to be contra, Eagle Lake v. Adams,
146 Fla. 165, 200 So. 367 (1941) (action allowed in 1940 to void 1925 annexation);
State ex rel. Landis v. Coral Gables, 129 Fla. 834, 177 So. 290 (1937) (delay of almost
10 years not fatal); State ex reL. Landis v. Boca Raton, 129 Fla. 673, 177 So. 293
(1937) (long delay not fatal per se if it has not prejudiced others).
'90The Court has been forced by the nature of the material in question to
invite review; as it observed, e.g., in State ex rel. Landis v. Boynton Beach, 129
Fla. 528, 533, 177 So. 327, 329 (1937), ". . . each case must stand or fall on its
own facts.... in some of them we held that delay was fatal in stated periods while
in others we refused to do so."
'9'Whitfield, J., presents an excellent summary in New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Oates, 141 Fla. 164, 175, 192 So. 637, 642 (1939).
192E.g., what facts, and what relative weights, distinguish customary delay and
normal human inadvertence from careless inaction and action inexcusably misleading?
'O'E.g., Winter Haven v. A. M. Klemnm & Son, 132 Fla. 334, 181 So. 153 (1938);
State ex rel. Fidelity Life Ass'n v. Cedar Key, 122 Fla. 454, 165 So. 672 (1936); see
the thorough analysis of de facto jurisdiction in the concurring opinion of
Whitfield, J., in State ex rel. Harrington v. Pompano, 136 Fla. 730, 755, 188 So.
610, 620 (1938).
9

1 4FLA. STAT.

§§171.06, 171.10, 171.14 (1951).
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Whenever the expansion consists of annexation of one municipality
by another the real property in each corporation is equally liable
under our general law for the existing debts and obligations of the
other 0 5 unless the expansion involves extension of limits by a city
of over ten thousand inhabitants pursuant to Section 171.05 of Florida
Statutes 1951, in which event the general law rule is the converse."19
Ever in the background is Article VIII, Section 8 of the Florida Constitution. The Legislature not only receives from it a confirmation of
its inherent power to create, regulate and abolish municipalities by
special act 9 7 but also is commanded to protect creditors upon abolition. It can, under its plenary power over municipalities, make the
annexed territory liable along with the annexing municipality for
debts of the latter incurred prior to annexation. In State ex rel.
Johnson v. Goodgame 98 for example, it abolished by special act
three towns and created a city comprising their inhabitants and boundaries and succeeding to their rights and liabilities. The two dissenters
queried the adequacy of creditor protection as set up in the plan, but
all the justices recognized the legislative power to prescribe succession
to rights and liabilities, subject of course to organic limitations such
as equal protection, geographical uniformity of taxation throughout
the city, and due process. 0 9 The same legislative power that encompasses formulation of liability succession by general law embraces also formulation by special act, especially inasmuch as this
latter method of manifesting the legislative will is not only not for0
bidden but is expressly confirmed. 0
VII.

RiELATIONS OF CrrY AND COUNTY

The rapid growth of Florida cities, intensified during and since
World War II, has extended considerably the overlap between counties and cities in both functions and officials. The growth of built-up
'05FLA. STAT. §171.10 (1951). The same rule apparently applies upon consolidation of a city or town and a taxing district under §171.14.
'96FLA. STAT. §171.06 (1951), governing §171.05 expansion.
'O7Subject in each instance to FLA. CoNsr. Art. III, §21 procedure.
19891 Fla. 871, 108 So. 836 (1936); accord, State v. West Palm Beach, 127 Fla.
849, 174 So. 334 (1937).
1ooCompare, e.g., State ex rel. Harrington v. Pompano, 136 Fla. 730, 188 So.
610 (1939), affd on rehearing,136 Fla. 775, 188 So. 629 (1939), with Fahs v. Kilgore,
136 Fla. 701, 187 So. 170 (1939).
200For the history and ultimate combined effect of FLA. CoNsr. Art. II, §§20,
21, 24, and Art. VIII, §8 see II, 1 supra.
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areas outside city limits has further complicated local problems. In
some instances the remedy has been expansion of city boundaries; in
many others, as in Dade and Volusia Counties, the solution attempted
has been the creation of satellite communities around the major
city.201 In still other instances county functions have been expanded
so as to provide county zoning boards.202 Finally, some consolidations
of city and county functions have been effected, and a few proposals
for complete city-county consolidation have been advanced. Having
discussed annexation203 we now turn to functional consolidation and
rendition of services by cities outside their limits.
1. Consolidation of Functions
Consolidation of functions has occurred principally in such fields
as tax assessment, tax collection, and registration for elections. A
1946 amendment to our Constitution empowered the Legislature to
consolidate, in Orange County alone, any county offices not judicial,
as well as to provide for county assessment and collection of municipal
taxes.2 0 4 Since 1944 several other populous counties have consolidated
20 5
their city and county tax assessments, their tax collections, or both;
and an amendment proposing to consolidate the tax assessment function alone in Monroe County will be voted on in the general election
of 1954.206
More important still, the 1953 Legislature has proposed for adoption or rejection next year a general amendment authorizing it at
future sessions to require by special act that tax collectors or assessors of any county take over the same functions for cities in their
respective counties. If this amendment is adopted the Legislature will
2olThe preliminary computation of the United States Bur. of Census for 1950 lists
18 satellite cities around Miami. By 1953 their number had increased to 25.
2o2See BARTLEY AND

BoYER, MUNICIPAL

ZONING,

FLORIDA

LAW

AND

PRAcrICE

(1950), U. of Fla. Pub. Adm'n Clearing Serv. Studies in Pub. Adm'n Ser. No. 6,
as well as Bartley, supra note 71.
203See VI supra.
2O4FLA. CONSr. Art. XX, §1; see also notes 207, 208 infra.
205This note gives the section numbers as corrected by the statutory revisor
in the official version of the Constitution, rather than those erroneously assigned
by the Legislature in its joint resolutions, and also shows dates of electoral adoption
in parentheses: Hillsborough, FLA. CONsT. Art. VIII, §§12,13 (1944); St. Lucie, id.
§§14,15 (1948); Volusia, id. §§16,17 (1948); Broward, id. §§18,19 (1948); Pinellas,
id. §§20,21 (1948).
206HJ. REs. No. 858, filed, Sec'y of State, June 15, 1953.
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again possess beyond a doubt its inherent power 207 to institute functional consolidation of city and county assessments and collections
"by general, special or local act," but with the limitation that
".. no such act, except the provisions thereof for a referendum election, may become effective in any municipality until approved by a majority vote of the electors qualified to vote in such municipality."~s
The amendment is in one sense restrictive; mere notice as to special
bills to be introduced pursuant to it will not suffice, inasmuch as
referendum is expressly made a prerequisite to their effectivity. Whether the amendment enlarges legislative power substantially is debatable. The Constitution forbids "special or local laws ...regulating
the jurisdiction and duties of any class of officers, except municipal
officers . .. ."29 Nevertheless the Supreme Court has held, in State
ex rel. Armstrong v. Morqus, 210 that municipal functions can be
transferred to county officers by statute, leaving the ordinances intact
and the old or enlarged boundaries as those of a special municipal
district in which county officers execute the municipal functions as
officers of the district.
The Court has for years construed the word "officers" in the quoted
passage as equivalent to "offices"; the jurisdiction and duties of county
offices cannot be changed by special act, but any county officer can be
assigned extra noncounty functions.
This reasoning is fully set forth in State ex rel. Landis v. Armstrong,21' following earlier decisions in upholding a special act directing the circuit court clerk to perform Pensacola municipal election
duties. Later, however, the Court unanimously held in Vassar v.
Arnold212 that the St. Lucie County tax assessor could not by special
207FLA. CONsT. Art. III, §20 forbade, right from the adoption of the present
Constitution, special or local legislation on several items, including the jurisdiction
and duties of any class of officers other than municipal, and also on assessment and
collection of taxes for state and county purposes.
208H.J. Rrs. No. 851, filed, Sec'y of State, June 15, 1953.
209See note 207 supra.
210160 Fla. 215, 34 So.2d 113 (1948). Over objection that the statute violated
FLA. CONSr. Art. III, §20, mandamus was granted to require the referendum vote
provided in Fla. Spec. Acts 1947, c. 24379, authorizing, upon favorable vote, abolition of the existing town of Arcadia and transfer of the duties of its city officials
to the DeSoto County officials, who would thereupon function as officers of the
Arcadia Municipal District, the successor municipal corporation. The vote on
referendum was unfavorable.
211103

Fla. 121, 137 So. 140 (1931).

212154

Fla. 757, 18 So.2d 906 (1944). The judgment itself is fully sustained, how-
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act be made ex officio the Fort Pierce assessor. The previous decisions
to the contrary were not even mentioned, let alone overruled; the
opinion simply states, as regards legislative imposition of extra administrative duties on state or county officers by special act, ".... we
have never extended this principle to municipalities." 213 This statement was contrary to fact. Less than a year later, in Cooley v. State
ex rel. Aldrich,21 4 the Court again executed an about-face and unanimously upheld a special act assigning to the Pinellas County supervisor of registration the duties of registration officer for Clearwater,
without overruling or even mentioning Vassar v. Arnold.
The decided weight of Florida authority is that an assignment of
municipal functions to county officers does not violate the Constitution, but the bench has apparently failed to recognize that it has two
diametrically opposed lines of authority, with neither expressly overruled. The interpretation currently in vogue again is not far-fetched
when the passage is read in its context; 2 5 and the result is a practical
advantage to all concerned except, perhaps, that rare county official
28
who finds himself saddled with more duties than he can handle.
Just this year the Legislature by statute authorized abolition of
the city government of Miami and transfer of its functions to the
Dade County officers, subject to local referendum.2"7 This time the
constitutional question presented in Morqus was not raised, probably
because of that decision. In any event, the 18proposal failed by a small
margin to carry at the June 9 referendum."
Another type of consolidation, attempted in Florida several times,
has met with no success, namely, complete consolidation of cities and
counties. Constitutional amendment is definitely necessary to transfer Florida county functions to city officers. 2 9 In 1934 an amendment
ever, on the ground that the ordinance contravened FLA. CoNsr. Art. IX, §5
(alternative holding).
2"'Id. at 759, 18 So.2d at 907.
"14155 Fla. 703, 21 So.2d 347 (1945).
215The context indicates that this prohibition, like the others in FLA. CONST.
Art. III, §20, was designed not primarily to shield state and county "officers" from
extra administrative duties but rather to prevent random tinkering with county
"offices" and their jurisdiction.
2161n most instances the additional work entails no more than additional paper
and stenographic assistance, which can and certainly should be furnished in view
of the economy effected in overall operations.
217Fla. Spec. Acts 1953, c. 29280, filed, Sec'y of State, June 14, 1953.
2"sFor vote results see Miami Herald, June 10, 1953, p. 1.
2"9 See note 207 supra.
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permitting consolidation of Duval County and Jacksonville was
adopted,220 but the county referendum specified in the amendment
resulted in an unfavorable verdict. A similar amendment was adopted
for Key West and Monroe County in 1936,221 but the consolidation
has not been put into effect. The question of partial or functional
city-county consolidation is also under consideration for Tallahassee
and Leon County,222 and a commission financed by the city and county
jointly has been established to consider the matter. The inquiry may
lead to some degree of consolidation in at least one Florida county.
In other states consolidation of county and city governments have
been effected, for example Fulton County and Atlanta, Georgia, but
223
in Florida no such sweeping proposals have succeeded to date.
2. Increased Rates for Services Outside City Limits
The picture of problems and relationships between cities and
the suburban areas adjacent would be incomplete without mentioning
2
one other type of device or expedient, today in effect in many cities,2 4
namely, an increase in utility rates for services supplied outside the
city limits. Municipalities often make these extra charges for sewer
and water services, and they may also impose higher electricity and
gas rates if they serve as distributor. These charges are designed not
only to meet in part the cost of added utility trunk lines but also to
recover some of the costs of those services, such as fire protection and
garbage collection, that are of benefit to suburban dwellers. Frequently
the municipality extends its fire mains into adjacent sections, and its
trucks go out on call as well. Its library and recreation facilities
serve those within and without the city limits.
Despite these increased charges, however, those dwelling inside
the city limits still pay more than their share of the costs. These procedures are at best stop-gaps; and pressure to annex suburban areas
is building up, especially among citizens of the corporations furnishing
the facilities.
220FLA.

CONST. Art. VIII, §9.

221FLA. CONsT. Art. VIII, §10.

Spec. Acts 1953, c. 29244, filed, Sec'y of State, June 15, 1953.
223Organization of county government is not treated here. For consideration
of this problem in Florida see DOVELL, FLORIDA'S COUNTY GOVERNMENT (1952),
U. of Fla. Pub. Adm'n Clearing Serv. Civic Info. Ser. No. 13; CouNTY REORGANIZATION AND TuE FLORMA CONSTTUTION (June 1953), U. of Fla. Econ. Leaflets.
224See KILPATRIC, op. cit. supra note 85.
222Fla.
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VIII.

METHODS OF REVISING OR AMENDING CHARTERS

Having already reviewed the procedure for the establishment of
a city, the forms of government available, and the problems relating
to its initial boundaries and powers, 225 we now examine the legal
processes by which a city government already in existence can alter
its form. Florida offers two: special act and statutory municipal home
rule.
1. Special Act
The relative ease with which special legislation can be enacted
prompts its use in the overwhelming number of new charters promulgated and in amendments to existing charters.22r In practice all
that is necessary is to secure approval of the change by the senator
and the House delegation representing the county involved. Once
their approval is obtained they introduce a special bill, passage of
which in the House and Senate is automatic. 22 7 Yet, provided the bill
has been duly advertised for thirty days in advance of introduction,
228
inclusion of a referendum provision is optional, not mandatory.
A special bill of this type can not only amend partially an existing
municipal charter or replace it entirely with another229 but can also
enlarge the territorial boundaries. 230
2. Statutory Limited Municipal Home Rule
In the second form of procedure for amending partially or completely a Florida municipal charter the citizens of a city do the job
themselves, pursuant to authority granted by general law.232 The
delegation of this power to municipalities by general law is consti2

25See HI-V supra.
details of this special act procedure have already been considered; see
II, 2 supra.
2
27See notes 178-180 supra and text thereat.
228FLA. CONST. Art. II, §21; see JU, 1 supra.
229
State ex rel. Gibbs v. Couch, 139 Fla. 353, 190 So. 723 (1939). The Legis226The

lature can even abolish an existing municipal corporation, provide a new one,
and empower the Governor to appoint the new municipal officials, as was done
for Daytona Beach by Fla. Spec. Laws 1939, c. 19768, upheld in the Gibbs case,
supra. When a municipality is abolished, however, provision must be made for
protection of its creditors, FL.A. CONsr. Art. VIII, §8; see notes 198, 199 supra and
text thereat.

-3OSee VI, 2, supra.
2
3'FLA. STAT. c. 166 (1951), enacted as Fla. Laws 1915, c. 6940.
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tutional; 23 2 but the scope of this general law grant is strictly limited
by the opening section of the chapter to changes in local governmental
structure, election machinery, and the manner of exercising municipal
powers already granted. It does not authorize alteration of boundaries fixed by special act; 233 neither does it confer authority to
assume by self-grant any powers beyond those conferred by special
act 22 ' or general law. All constitutional limitations apply, of course,
just as they do to a statute.
Shortly after the passage in 1915 of the limited municipal home
rule general act 235 a city attempted to utilize these provisions to
authorize itself by charter amendment to issue bonds for construction
of a gas plant and for other improvements. Its charter did not at the
time encompass such action. In reversing denial of injunction Mr.
Justice Ellis, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated emphatically
in commenting on the 1915 statute in Pursley v. Fort Myers:230
"The first section of the act contains the grant of power to
cities and towns. The remaining sections of the act prescribe
the methods or procedure according to which the powers
granted in the first section may be made available. A careful
analysis of the first section of the act will reveal that the pur232State ex rel. Brown v. Emerson, 126 Fla. 576, 171 So. 663 (1936), specifically
considering the effect of the 1934 amendment to FLA. CONsr. Art. 1I1, §24.
233FLA. STAT. §166.01 (1951). E.g., Beaty v. Inlet Beach, Inc., 151 Fla. 495, 9
So.2d 735 (1942). Note, however, that boundary expansion by local action authorized by special act charter or amendment thereto prescribing a certain procedure
can be pursued until such legislative permission is withdrawn; see notes 168, 169
supra and text thereat. For ratification confirming and thereby validating extension by ordinance initially invalid because of procedurally incorrect exercise
of existing authority see City of Sebring v. Harder Hall, Inc., 150 Fla. 824, 9
So.2d 350 (1942), distinguishing exercise void and statutorily incurable because
of lack of authority or violation of organic law, as appears, e.g., in State ex rel.
Landis v. Lake Placid, 121 Fla. 839, 164 So. 531 (1935) (on rehearing).
234FLA. STAT. §166.01 (1951). For valid enlargement set forth in special act
charter, the factor held to be controlling, see State v. Fort Lauderdale, 60 So.2d 32
(Fla. 1952); for valid charter change pursuant to special act authorizing city to
change form of charter by referendum without affecting powers of city see Lenfesty Supply Co. v. Tampa, 142 Fla. 611, 195 So. 412 (1940); for special act alteration of city election procedure as superseding all except home rule provisions
relating to charter boards see State ex rel. Brown v. Emerson, 126 Fla. 576, 171 So.
663 (1936).

23 ee note 231 supra.

23a87 Fla. 428, 430-431, 100 So. 366, 367 (1924).
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pose of the Legislature was to authorize any city or town to
change its form of government or method of exercising the
jurisdiction and powers already granted to it by legislative
enactment. No city or town was authorized by that act to enlarge its corporate powers beyond limitations prescribed by
law, as the proviso to the section clearly indicates."
While upholding the constitutionality of this delegation of power
by our Legislature to municipalities, to the limited extent specified
in the statute, the Court declared nugatory a special act attempting
to validate the unauthorized action taken. The underlying philosophy
s
was concisely expressed:23
"But this court has never held that the Legislature can
delegate unlimited authority to a municipality to prescribe its
own jurisdiction and powers and to alter or amend the same at
any time. It cannot surrender the sovereignty of the State to
municipalities to the extent of losing control over them. Such
a doctrine ... would be a recognition of a State's independent
right of dissolution."
The Court consistently maintained its position until 1951 on
the scope of the home rule grant. 235 In Asbell v. Green23 9 it refused
to sanction the imposition, by an amendatory ordinance of a special
act charter, of a sales tax embracing isolated transactions, the sole
basis advanced by the city to justify this levy being its general law
power to raise money "by tax and assessment upon all real and per237Id. at 433, 100 So. at 368.
238E.g., Palm Beach v. Vlahos, 153 Fla. 781, 15 So.2d 839 (1943) (holding city
not liable for death due to negligent driving of fire chief outside the town limits
while taking plaintiff's husband on fishing trip in official car without authorization), opinion modified on extraordinary rehearing without altering judgment, 154
Fla. 159, 15 So.2d 848 (1944); Merrell v. St. Petersburg, 91 Fla. 858, 109 So. 315,
judgment changed to reversal on rehearing, 91 Fla. 870, 109 So. 319 (1926) (invalidating bond issue for failure to publish ordinance as required by special act
charter despite contention of city that it was authorized to follow the less exacting
procedure prescribed by later charter amendment purportedly adopted under
general law home rule provisions). A unanimous opinion states with, reference
to the earlier special act charter provision, id. at 870, 109 So. at 319: "There is
no authority authorizing the provisions of a Self-adopted Charter to supersede
and entirely nullify the provision contained in the legislative enactment."
239159 Fla. 702, 32 So.2d 593 (1947).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1953

51

Florida Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1953], Art. 7
MUNICIPAL CHARTERS
sonal property, and by license on professions, business and occupa,,240
tions carried on within the corporation ....
Recently, however, in Paramount-Gulf Theatres, Inc. v. Pensacola,241 the Court first reversed and then on rehearing affirmed a
decree validating a proposed issue of so-called revenue certificates
to finance construction of a municipal auditorium. These certificates
wvere secured to a very minor extent by pledge of revenues anticipated
from the auditorium, but the chief funds relied upon were the proceeds of a tobacco tax and of an amusement tax levied without challenge since 1937. In 1949 the Legislature by special act had ratified
the ordinance and all other proceedings relating to this pledge. The
per curiam opinion on rehearing construes confirmation of the pledge
as tantamount to authorization of the tax, but it does not even mention
the real issue. Legislative power to permit an excise levy of this sort
has not been questioned; but can a municipality take unauthorized
and therefore illegal action and later secure its validation by special
act? According to this 1951 decision a municipality can now do so,
yet the Court made no real effort to distinguish previous decisions.
A clear opinion that will stand for a time is sorely needed.
Meanwhile the true distinction between this line of cases permitting legislative confirmation of unauthorized taxation by ordinance
and the Pursley v. Fort Myers242 condemnation of attempted expansion of municipal powers generally by home rule, charter amendment
may center on the existence of power in the Legislature to authorize
in the first place the action taken. At no time can it constitutionally
hand municipalities a blank check to expand their powers as they
please. It can, however, grant a specific power in addition to those
currently enjoyed, and can accordingly ratify specific action taken in
excess of municipal jurisdiction in individual instances provided such
action has not violated organic law. The Pursley line of decisions
still stands as regards the scope of home rule, it is submitted; but the
Paramount-Gulf decision is a standing invitation to every Florida
municipality to act beyond its charter and general law powers by
promulgating unauthorized ordinances and then to validate its action
by rushing a special bill through the Legislature. The soundness of
this decision has yet to be demonstrated, needless to say.
240FLA. STAT.

§167.43 (1951).

24162 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1951), judgment changed to affirmance on rehearing, 62

So.2d 434 (Fla. 1952).
242See note 236 supra and text thereat.
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From the standpoint of local procedure in framing and adopting
charter amendments by the home rule method the city council or
commission can put the machinery in motion by adopting a resolution by majority vote of its members. This resolution sets a date,
which must be not less than forty nor more than ninety days after
adoption of the resolution, for a special election to choose resident
qualified voters as members of a charter board.2 4 3 This board must
have five members in municipalities of 5,000 or under, nine in cities
244
ranging from 5,001 through 20,000 and fifteen in all larger ones.
As an alternative first step for calling a charter board election at
least twenty percent of the qualified voters of the town or city sign
a petition, in which event the council or commission must proceed
as already outlined. 245 Upon failure of the council or commission, or
of the local election board if any, to call the election, mandamus is
available to obtain the prescribed action.248 The statute gives detailed
provisions for holding the special election; 247 and those candidates
248
receiving the highest number of votes constitute the board.
A handy Guide for Charter Commissions is published by the
National Municipal league.249 In Florida a charter board established
under general law home rule provisions must meet and organize
within thirty days after election; 250 and the municipality is required
to honor requisitions for expenses signed by the board chairman and
secretary. 251 Within ninety days of its election the board must draft
252
amendments to the charter and adopt them by a majority vote.
Upon completing its work the board sets a date for a special election,
to be held within sixty days of the board's final adjournment, to ap243FLA. STAT. §§166.02, 166.04 (1951). This procedure cannot be attempted
more than once in every 2 years. If a general election falls within the date limits
its date may be chosen for the vote on board members.
244FLA. STAT. §166.03 (1951).
245FLA. STAT. §166.05 (1951) (containing detailed requirements for form of
petition and checking of signatures to determine validity and eligibility to sign).
246State ex rel. Brown v. Blocks, 128 Fa. 649, 175 So. 232 (1937).
247F.A. STAT. §§166.06, 166.07 (1951).
248FLA. STAT. §166.07 (1951). The exact number prescribed by law must
be elected, of course; see note 244 supra and text thereat.
249299 Broadway, New York 7, N.Y.; price 50c.
250FLA. STAT. §166.08 (1951).
251FL. STAT. §166.09 (1951).
2521bid. The amendment may be a complete new charter as regards any or all
items specified in FLA. STAT. §166.01 (1951).
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prove or reject its proposals. 25 3 These, together with notice of the
election, must be published once a week for four weeks, beginning
at least twenty-five days before the election, in a local city newspaper.
If the city has none the proposals and notice must be published in
a newspaper in the county in the same manner, and in addition must
be posted at the city hall and two other conspicuous places in the
254
city for a least twenty-five days before the election.
To conduct the election the statute prescribes a special commission
of three members, appointed by the charter board, as well as directions for tabulating the returns; and the amendments become effective
ninety days after adoption by a majority of the voters casting ballots
in the special election unless a different effective date is set forth in
the amendments. 255 The usual succession to property, rights, debts
and obligations is provided; and incumbent officers occupy their
25 1
positions until new ones are elected.
The foregoing procedure has been considered in detail not only
because it constitutes an important method of amending city charters,
including complete revision of the provisions dealing with those items
enumerated in Section 166.01 of Florida Statutes 1951, but also because
proposals have been advanced in the past several sessions of the
Florida Legislature to amend the Constitution so as to forbid special
legislation for cities.257 Adoption of such an amendment would in
effect fully establish what is known as "constitutional municipal home
rule," enabling and forcing each city or town to assume the responsibility of enacting or altering its own charter. The Legislature could
still, of course, enact general laws regulating cities, but no special
legislation affecting municipal corporations would be valid.
This home rule system began in limited form with the Missouri
Constitution of 1875. California followed in 1879 by granting limited
home rule to all cities; and in 1887 it accorded a greater degree of
home rule to cities attaining at any time a population of over ten
thousand. Today eighteen states have instituted a program of this
type, although judicial interpretation in some of these still permits
§166.10 (1951).
§166.11 (1951).
§§166.12, 166.13 (1951).
§§166.14, 166.15 (1951).
resolutions, which when passed by both houses become proposed
constitutional amendments, FLA. CONsr. Art. XVII, §1, were introduced in 1949,
1951, and 1953.
253FLA. STAT.
254FLA. STAT.
255FLA. STAT.
250FLA. STAT.
25Such joint
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state legislative enactment in certain instances by law not general. 218
The National Municipal League has drafted a provision for municipal
home rule to be used in state constitutions.259
The strongest argument for municipal home rule is the elementary principle that those interested and directly involved appreciate
their problems more keenly and are better qualified to fashion their
local government and run it. Distance may lend to the view enchantment- but rarely accurate perception.
Another cogent practical factor is the lack of time in the Florida
Legislature to consider local bills intelligently, or even with any
interest. Our Legislature has been forced to adopt the policy of
handling all measures on the local bill calendar by consent unless the
local delegation in the House is divided in its opinion.20 0 This procedure in turn places a great burden on the senator and representatives
from the community concerned by shifting to them a responsibility
that should rest with the citizens themselves. In some instances the
choice of members of the Legislature may turn on their handling of
local bills, yet they should be, and ofttimes are, chosen on issues
pertaining to state affairs - the main business of the Legislature.
From the standpoint of efficiency in both state and local government
state legislators should, individually and as a whole, be relieved of
a responsibility that has today become anomalous. The proper place
to settle municipal affairs is in local elections; state elections should
be fought on state issues, and the legislators should be free to devote
their full time to the vital state problems requiring their attention,
including those that affect all local units of government and accordingly merit treatment by thoroughly considered general law.
The argument for retaining legislative power to enact local laws
for municipalities is of the let-well-enough-alone variety; the gist
of it is that the present system does provide for change, is speedy
once a special bill is introduced, is fairly flexible, and gives the local
folk what they need, even though they rarely know just what is being
258See McBAIN,
DONALD,
GoLDRicK,

AMtERICAN
LAW

(1916); Mc82-91 (1951); MCHoME RULE (1933). Constitutional

LAW AND PRAcTICE OF MUNIcIPAL HOME RULE
CrTy

GOVERNMENT

AND PRAcTICE

AND

OF MUNIcIPAL

provisions of other states are found in

ADMINISTRATION

THE NuMBER

1 PROBLEM: HOME RuLE

(1940), Report of Chicago Law Dep't.
259MODEL STATE CONST. Art. VIII, §801 (5th ed. 1948), obtainable from Nat.
Municipal League, 299 Broadway, New York 7, N.Y.; price $1.
26oOnly one senator is involved in a representative capacity as regards any
one Florida municipality. His unfavorable reaction kills the bill.
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done. Most students of the problem, however, including many of the
legislators, have reached the conclusion that special legislation is not
the preferable system.
IX.

DRAFrING TECHNIQUE

Good draftsmanship is far more subtle and more difficult to achieve
than neophytes in this elusive art realize - regardless of their age
and their experience in related fields.261 It requires firm grounding
in the substance of the particular area under consideration, extensive
and detailed research, imagination, ability to organize on a broad
scale, patience, and meticulosity. It also demands sweat -no intellectual labor is more exhausting physically -and enough self-restraint
to curb one's own pride of authorship plus enough tact to head off
this tendency in others before a bitter battle develops.
In addition a ready command of the language serving as the
medium of expression is essential. For the present the American student must pick this up for himself; the art of rhetoric presupposes
mastery of the science of grammar, and the latter has for many years
been seldom taught and at times not even displayed in our primary
and secondary schools. We should add, however, that several of the
leaders in education today are alive to the problem and that the results of their efforts will probably solve it eventually. From the
standpoint of future lawyers the need for training of this sort is
pressing; and in legal drafting the very simplicity and smoothness of
the products of the skilled worker tend to conceal the extensive
training and the intensive effort that go into them.
Only a few basic suggestions are appropriate to a summary article
of this type, but a blueprint of the technique of drafting a municipal
charter can be presented in a few pages. The process breaks rather
naturally into five stages: ascertainment of the problem at hand, research, organization of material, polishing, and checking. Effective
2GlThis portion of the article cites very little outside authority. It is based
on Prof. Dauer's many years of participation in the work of U. of Fla. Pub. Adm'n
Clearing Serv. and Prof. Miller's lectures and experience in College of Law Legis.
Drafting Seminar, as well as on his early training under such outstanding draftsmen of major corporate and financial instruments as Henry Clay Alexander, now
President of J. P. Morgan & Co. Incorporated, George A. Brownell, Ralph M.
Carson, Porter R. Chandler, Leighton H. Coleman, Edgar G. Crossman, Thomas
O'G. FitzGibbon, Charles M. Spofford, Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, and that old
maestro of any type of legal work, John W. Davis.
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work entails dealing both with books and with people. Conferences
are usually necessary at three of these stages, and sometimes at four
or all five. The stages themselves are neither mutually exclusive nor
always in the above order; complicated projects frequently necessitate return to an earlier stage and even a blend of stages. Finally,
as the reader has probably gathered by now, legal drafting is not
merely setting pencil to paper. The actual writing of the instrument
in final or near-final form, popularly misconceived as the essence of
drafting, does not even begin until the bulk of the work has been done.
As that master draftsman, Professor Harry W. Jones, 8- 2 has so aptly
remarked, "Legal drafting is far more than a mere exercise in grammar." This remark, which seemed shocking to many when made, is
by now a truism.
1. Ascertainment of the Problem
The first step is so obvious that the sprinting attorney often hurdles it - only to discover at the end of a brilliant race that he entered
the wrong event. Some problems have nothing whatever to do with
drafting; the requisite provision may already exist, and the proper
execution of it may be all that is needed.
Again, a minor revision, enacted by charter board or special act
procedure and formulated as a correction in the light of actual experience, may suffice. In this event the best approach is a short, direct
repeal, alteration or addition, usually by special act in Florida. On
the other hand the community may be seeking its first charter, or the
changes desired in practice may be extensive both in spread and
in individual content. In either of these events a complete new
instrument is called for, including specific and perhaps sweeping
repeal of deadwood.
Even at this stage of the work the procedure to be utilized must
be considered to some extent. A schedule of ultimate deadlines on
preparation and publication of notice, approval meetings, time of
introduction as a bill, and other vital steps should-be set up with
reference to the specific procedure available and selected.
As in every endeavor in the practice of law the first step is to determine precisely what the client is driving at, what he is complaining
262Professor of Law, Columbia University, and Director of the Legislative Drafting Research Fund, the pioneer organization of this type in the United States,
with four decades of service to its credit.
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of, what he wants. Simple though this step may be at times, it is
vital unless counsel has plenty of time to squander on abortive efforts.
2. Research
Only a portion of the total research requires participation by the
client. The nature and scope of this stage of the work depends, of
course, on the problem under attack, but the first part of this research
stage in drafting a municipal charter or an amendment to one can
best be undertaken by the draftsman alone. Even in preparing a
simple contract in writing the skilled practitioner knows from experience that a "meeting of the minds" presupposes a realization of
the issues on which those minds are to meet. Time and again his
client has overlooked completely some important item, and as counselor-at-law he focuses his client's attention on it before dispute arises.
The same practice should be followed for any instrument; the draftsman is in part a human checklist.
Legal Background. Before any draftsman decides what he should
do he has to know what he can do. Three suggestions are offered as
regards types of law to be covered. All three are best approached by
reading analytical articles, but the source material should later be
consulted as the ultimate authority.
First, he should check the relevant constitutional provisions; any
error on this score normally proves fatal. Second, he should check
the statutes in point, making certain that he has gathered at least
the gist of all those that apply. Third, he should read the leading
opinions in the area and absorb them as general background. 263 Invariably they bring to light pitfalls not even noticed in a perusal of
the constitutional and statutory provisions, and at times they illustrate
26 4
the familiar adage that words do not mean what they say.
Form Background. Every able attorney uses forms. They save
time. They bring to light matters that might be overlooked completely. They also provide examples of skilled or inept drafting. The
draftsman should never follow them slavishly, but he should not
263For a list of these as regards Florida municipal law background see note 15
supra. This list is not exhaustive, but neither are the opinions exhausting.
264E.g., FLx. CONsr. Art. VIII, §8 when read alone, discussed in II, 1 supra;
Art. IX, §6, discussed in V, 4 supra under Motor Vehicle Parking.
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waste time in reproducing, often in an inferior manner, the products
of the efforts of others, achieved in many instances after hours of
drudgery and perhaps bitter experience.
An excellent starting point is the Model City Charter,265 which in
its drafting has consumed thousands of hours since 1900 and which
embodies the research and background experience of some of the
best minds in the United States in the field of municipal government
and law. Though predicated on the home rule concept in state organic
law, and though designed primarily for the council-manager type of
city government, many of its provisions can be put into effect in
Florida by special act and can in large part be adapted to one of the
other types of local government. Being a model, it is designedly comprehensive; specific local exigencies may well warrant deletion,
alteration or expansion of its content. In any event, however, omissions of the draftsman will spring from choice rather than from ignorance; and a long step toward precision in phraseology in an entire
individual charter can be taken without wasted effort. Numerous
explanatory footnotes give the reasons underlying certain provisions,
and the appendices present optional additions of importance to many
cities.
This charter deals specifically with governmental organization,
structure, and personnel; nominations and elections; budget, finance,
and borrowing for capital improvements; planning, zoning, housing,
slum clearance, and blighted areas; initiative and referendum as regards ordinances; and succession in government. It also contains
several general provisions and miscellaneous clauses not infrequently
overlooked. Desired special powers can readily be added, of course.
Other useful forms for the Florida draftsman are Florida municipal
charters, of which there are a variety. He should of course select a
few that are relevant to his task. Most Florida municipal charters
contain provisions designed to meet problems peculiar to the individual community. Certain charters are worthy of checking, however, if a charter board or some other drafting group desires to establish a similar form of government; and in any event those charters
that have been molded gradually and tested in their operation are
valuable in preparing a checklist of items to be considered for inclusion.
Miami and St. Petersburg, among larger cities, have this system
of municipal government; cities of medium or smaller size include
265For availability and price see note 32 supra.
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Coral Gables, Gainesville, and Vero Beach. A recent charter of this
type is that of Opa-Locka, drafted in 1953. The mayor-council form
of government is found in Orlando and Tampa, for example, as well
as in smaller cities. The commission form is practically nonexistent
in Florida. Jacksonville has a combination of this system and the
mayor-council form, but no other city has been tempted to follow
this curious hybrid.
The draftsman can readily procure copies of Florida municipal
charters. First, virtually all are special acts; therefore they may be
found by looking up the special acts desired. This method of checking
charters is not recommended, however, inasmuch as the original
charter is usually amended later and the amendments will probably
be overlooked; and yet, since many of these modify or repeal unsatisfactory provisions in the original charter, they may well be even
more important than the basic enactment. Second, many cities print
their charters in pamphlet form; application for a copy should be
addressed to the city clerk. Third, many of the larger cities have
codes that are published by lawbook companies, and information on
obtaining these can readily be obtained from the city attorney or the
city clerk. They are up to date and include ordinances as well as the
charter and all its amendments. They may seem somewhat expensive,
but the price is reasonable when one considers the labor costs of
printers today and the limited number of copies printed and sold.
Fact Background. The acquisition of an adequate fact background,
as might be expected, involves discussions with the client, usually
several people in the case of municipal charters. At this point the
general grounding in this field, which the draftsman should already
possess, comes into play. He is not expected to know in advance the
facts relating to the individual city, but he should know what types
of facts to look for and what questions to ask, systematically and
rapidly. He should make brief, accurate notes of all pertinent data,
and should dictate a memorandum of the conference from these while
the matter is still fresh in his mind. If the client does not know the
answers and cannot dig them out the draftsman will do well to advise
that an expert in the particular field be consulted and that a careful
26
study be made by a person trained to do the job well. r
266Specialized fields include, e.g., finance and fiscal policy, personnel, public
utilities, libraries, zoning, traffic control, business and industrial factors in relation

to special powers, and public relations.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol6/iss3/7

60

Miller and Dauer: Municipal Charters in Florida: Law and Drafting
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
This expert need not, of course, be an outsider. The specialist
on the staff of the municipality will in most instances either have
the answers already or be able to find them within a short time. A
zoning section of the charter should be drafted in consultation with
the city planner; provisions for a building code should be checked by
the consulting architect and the chief building inspector. The ordinances later enacted must have a sufficiently broad basis in the charter.
The point is that the difficulties in drafting a charter vary directly
with the increasing complexities of urban life and the expansion of
local governmental functions. The draftsman of today profits heavily
by an interchange of ideas with the specialists in the functional areas
involved; indeed, he cannot do a competent overall job without their
active assistance.
The efficiency and dispatch with which the draftsman handles
this conference will not only ease his further labors but will also make
an impression, good or bad, on the client as to whether he knows
what he is doing. Few clients realize the complexity of the task;
indeed, many do not even have a dear concept of their problem.
This conference enables the draftsman to dispel the fond notion that
anyone can dash off a charter, or even an amendment; and a reasonable fee, when presented, will not seem exorbitant. And if the draftsman knows what he is about and does not waste time he can afford
to charge a reasonable fee and still pay his landlord, his staff, and
the publishers of his tools of the profession.
3. Organization
The organization stage of municipal law drafting, especially when
a new charter is wanted, is perhaps the most trying period of all.
The draftsman finds that he has a myriad ideas floating about in his
head, many of them disconnected, and that certain new pieces of data
do not seem to fit in anywhere. At least, however, he will not lose
them if he has made a thorough memorandum at the dose of the
second stage. At this point of intellectual wrestling the subconscious
mind is of invaluable aid. Even psychologists do not yet know exactly
how it works, but those of us that have used it know that it does work
- provided, of course, that it has been fed some raw material. Inspirations do not just pop up, and neither do solutions to drafting problems; they must be pursued. The sit-back-and-wait technique is pure
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myth. Accordingly the work of organization must get under way in
a deliberate manner.
Simple Draft. The first step in the organization stage is to write
a simple, straightforward statement of the proposed solution to the
problem, making use of the data already reduced to summary and
employing the framework of the procedure selected for actual enactment into law. At this point a stenographer is not only an unnecessary luxury but even an actual nuisance. The equipment needed
is a pad and, as Dr. Hasse 0. Enwall used to tell us, "a few sharp
pencils and several sharp wits."2617
Style is unimportant; the immediate goal is to set down the content, plainly and bluntly, in rudimentary English. The product of
this effort will almost certainly be scrapped later, but the skeleton
will justify the labor. If this skeleton resembles no recognizable creature some bones are undoubtedly missing -and the sooner the draftsman discovers these gaps, the better. He can readily hang flesh and
a smooth skin onto any respectable skeleton. This skeleton itself and
the effort that goes into putting it together seem to stimulate somehow
the subconscious, which, we repeat, cannot work on nothing. To
the neophyte at drafting, this step may also demonstrate a need for
more data and a further conference, so that he can get the answers to
what he should have asked in the first conference after the initial
ascertainment of the problem posed by his client.
Comprehensive Redraft. The next step in organization is to review
all notes, along with any additional data recalled, and to hang this
flesh onto the skeleton in appropriate places. Many bits will not fit
at first; some will not fit at all. In this event probably the skeleton
needs remolding in one or two places. Few skeletons are exactly alike;
and the flesh must be proportionate to the bones, whatever the creature may look like when completed. The skin, applied later, will
fit any shape and size, fortunately.
The content should be comprehensive and coherent at this point.
Before embarking upon his final stages the draftsman should again
confer with his client. This is the time, after painstaking sorting and
organization of what he believes his client wants, to make sure that
he has the substance firmly in hand, that he has included everything
2i7Recalled by both authors from the molder of the department of philosophy
at University of Florida, one of the "greats" in the history of the teaching profession.
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and has not unwittingly added items not desired. In other words,
he wants to get all thoughts dear at this stage, without regard to
polished phraseology. He should not feel hurt or be surprised if
his client suffers a change of heart; clients are notorious for their
bobbing and weaving, if for no other reason than the fact that they
are human and consequently do not always know what they really
desire when first interviewed. The memorandum of the preliminary
conference will at this point assist in persuading both the client and
the draftsman that the latter is not losing his mind.
Pride of authorship must be handled with a firm rein here; the
draftsman should be prepared to undertake further extensive revision
of concepts if his client is not satisfied with the skeleton and flesh presented. The draftsman should always have some practical suggestions
to offer, but he should never attempt to dictate policy. There are
two reasons for this rule: he is not in most instances competent to
evaluate policy, and in any event he as a professional draftsman is
underwriting solely the legal, not the practical, efficacy of the product.
Once the content is finally determined the draftsman should retire to his study.
4. Polishing
The stage of applying polish, of arriving at final formulation, is
regarded by the layman as the whole of drafting. Nothing could be
further from the truth, yet this stage is nonetheless an important
one. The draftsman now shifts his emphasis from content to form,
from thought to expression. This task demands intense concentration,
with no interruptions or distractions, and meticulous attention to detail. The goals to seek are somewhat like those of the short story,
but in inverse order and with reader interest assumed. In legal drafting
the major goals are accuracy, clarity, conciseness, and readability, with
the last two about on a par in importance.
Accuracy. The primary target is accuracy, that is, a full, definite
coverage of each thought without conflict or inconsistency among the
various thoughts. No item of importance should be left either to
the imagination of the judge in the inevitable ensuing dispute or
with the fond hope that there may be a general law on it somewhere.
At this point the "standard clauses," those covering such items as
personal interest disability, repeal of existing law, severability, lib-
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eral construction, effective date, and short title, should be carefully
considered and, if applicable, inserted.
Precision in phraseology is of course essential. Every concept must
be mastered, however balky it may be. The familiar expression, "I
know it but I can't say it," is a contradiction in terms. Any definite
idea can be definitely expressed; fuzzy wording denotes fuzzy thinking.
Clarity. Clarity is akin to accuracy, but it implies something more,
namely, a brand of presentation keyed to simplicity and forthright
expression. The average reader of any particular type of document
should be able to comprehend its exact meaning readily, without resort to judicial interpretation or even advice of counsel unless the
instrument is designed primarily for attorneys. Clarity presupposes
organization and logical order in delineating concepts as well as painstaking removal of any ambiguity in each phrase. The instrument
should move forward in a coherent sequence of ideas; and no section
or clause should throw doubt on the meaning of what has already
been said. Whenever ambiguity or inconsistency does crop out probably both passages involved need rephrasing.
Conciseness. Conciseness is not mere brevity, although brevity is
an important ingredient. In any legal instrument, and especially
in one as basic as a charter, as many words should be used as are necessary to present each concept accurately once - and only once. Stylistic flourishes are taboo; the most skillfully drafted legal instruments
are strikingly similar in style in any one language. The desired
brevity is never achieved, however, by cutting out essential points or
using vague, general terminology, cryptic though it may be, but rather
by correct sentence structure and a nice choice of concrete words.
The modern lawyer is not paid at so much per word; in fact, conciseness is at a premium in the maze of legislative and administrative
jargon hurled at the United States citizen of today.
Readability. A fourth quality, perhaps equally valuable, is readability. The skilled draftsman avoids complex and cumbersome
sentences, "hanging clauses," exceptions to exceptions, and provisos
piled one upon another.268 Numbers and letters to highlight parallel
concepts are desirable. Only one term should be used to designate a
concept, and only one concept should be ascribed to a given term in
268FLA.

CONsr. Art. III, §21 is an illustration of what not to do.
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the same instrument. Lengthy repetition should be avoided; but
every cross reference should be specific, and the passage referred to
should be applicable "as is," without cross-provisos. When, in rare
instances, repetition becomes unavoidable the concept should be repeated in exactly the same terms, lest the bench later assume that the
change in wording was intended as a change in meaning. Furthermore
the draftsman must remember the location of each repetition; any
alteration in one place necessitates the same alteration in the others. - 9
In complicated or lengthy instruments an opening section of definitions is of great value; the draftsman can then employ the short
term there ascribed to a specific concept at perhaps a hundred places
in the instrument. He must, however, stick rigidly to his definition in
every use of that term.
Format is closely related to readability. The trained eye expects
consistency in symbols, and any jumping about when no difference is
intended slows the reader down needlessly. Format in legal writing
resembles functionally the rules of procedure and evidence in court the norms of presentation. Specifically, capitalization, spelling, hyphenation, punctuation, and italicization should each adhere to one pattern throughout. The draftsman usually has more than one correct
pattern to choose from, but only one choice per instrument is per2 0
missible. 7
5. Checking
When the draftsman is satisfied with his product the final stage
of his work begins. This stage is laborious, is boring, and may seem
unnecessary; at this point he probably feels that he never wants to
see another charter and that he entered the wrong profession. Nevertheless he should force himself to finish the job. The checks to be made
can be styled for convenient listing as the front check, the back check,
the cross check, and the verbiage check.
The front check indicates whether the draftsman has spoken
broadly enough and also whether his language produces a result that
is logically and grammatically sound and legally permissible yet practically absurd. The framers of the Constitution of the United States,
perhaps the most able group of draftsmen ever assembled, evidently
26gFor illustration of this error see note 27 supra.
27oFor exceptionally poor format see FLA. CONST. Then contrast U.S. CONST.,
written in an old style but faithful to that style throughout.
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failed to realize that the electoral college system, when coupled with
the provision that the candidate with the greatest number of electoral
college votes should be President and the one with the next greatest
should be Vice-President, would almost certainly result in placing
bitter rivals from opposing political parties in these two important
posts. 271 This slip had to be corrected by amendment.2 72 If this sort
of thing can happen to draftsmen like those it can happen to anyone.
True, this type of error is really one of content, but occasionally the
practical effect of a concept does not strike home until that concept
is put down in black and white and in final form.
The back check is fully as important as the front check. Has the
draftsman said too much, that is, included more than his client intended? Those very draftsmen just mentioned made this type of error
too. They obviously intended to accord the Supreme Court of the
United States original jurisdiction in suits between nation and state,
between states, or between a state and a foreign nation. Since a state
appears in all three categories, they referred to these cases as "those in
,,273 Unwittingly they included a
which a State shall be Party ...
suit by any individual against a state. Another amendment was re274
quired to correct this language.
The cross check is designed to ferret out ambiguities. It is rediculous, for example, to levy a state tax expressly replacing all county
and city taxation of a given incidence and then to provide later in
the same statute that there is no intent to repeal any tax "now imposed by law and not specifically repealed hereby." 275 Errors of this
type are not uncommon, and they frequently come to light for the
first time in the final draft. Still more elusive is the inconsistency
or ambiguity that falls short of producing head-on conflict. 276 Only
271U.S.

CoNs'r., Art. I, §1. The basic reason for this section may well have

been the failure to anticipate the formation of political parties on a national
scale; see DAuER, THE ADAMS FEDERALISTs 3-5 (1953).
2721d. Amend. XII.

273Id. Art. I1, §2.
2741d. Amend. XI.
27For this error see the opinion of Brown, J., written with his usual patience
and tolerance, in American Bakeries Co. v. Haines City, 131 Fla. 790, 800, 180
So. 524, 528 (1938); see also Thomas, J., in Miller v. Phillips, 157 Fla. 175, 176,
25 So.2d 194 (1946), and his masterpiece of understatement in referring to the
"
jargon of FLA. STAT. §708.08 (1951) as "decidedly interesting ....
27GSee, e.g., the tangled skein presented to the bench in Miami v. South Miami
Coach Lines, Inc., 59 So.2d 52 (Fla. 1952).
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a careful analysis of the final instrument will bring this type of error
into the spotlight.
The verbiage check consists of going through every sentence and
ruthlessly cutting out each unneeded word. Detailed discussion of
"gobbledegook" requires an article in itself, and accordingly verbiage
is merely mentioned here.277 For illustrations one has only to turn
to most of the Florida Constitution and ninety percent of the Florida
Statutes. The legal draftsman should have enough consideration for
the time and purse of his fellow members of the bar, as well as for
his own purse, to make a deliberate effort to minimize useless printing.
Legal instruments are not pretty things at best, but they can achieve
in some measure the classic beauty of simplicity.
The charter is at last ready and meets all tests. At this point the
client will not infrequently announce blandly that he does not really
want to make any move on the matter after all -but this gets into
2 s
another story too poignant for this issue. 7
CONCLUSION

The municipal charter is a little constitution. Its drafting merits
thorough consideration. No constitutional lawyer would undertake
to draft a new organic instrument for the government of the United
States or of a state without resigning himself to months of arduous
labor; and no businessman would embark on a corporate organization
without paying close heed to the preparation of appropriate articles
of incorporation.
The ideal charter should be as nearly complete within itself as
possible. To have all pertinent material assembled in one document
is to save valuable time on the part of its administrators. This procedure also tends to focus attention on gaps, conflicts, inconsistencies
and ambiguities. Furthermore the draftsman should insert even the
standard general powers in the charter. General law grants of power
may well be altered or repealed without the consent or even the
knowledge of the municipality. In this event the sole reliance for
the powers needed is the charter itself, which if enacted by special
277Some excellent practical suggestions on this score appear in

HENDERSON,

15-17 (1952). Mr. Henderson is director of statutory
revision and bill drafting in Florida; his entire pamphlet, distributed by the
attorney general, is strongly recommended.
27s[Editor's Note: Or for any other issue of this publication.]
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legislative act always survives inconsistency with general statutes and
overrides conflict also unless the later general law provision manifests
a definite intent to supersede all conflicting laws of any type.279 In
all instances of doubt as to the applicability, meaning or scope of general law the safe move is to spell out the concept in the charter.
No amendment should be made without reviewing the entire
charter to see whether the change affects some other existing portion;
and any limitation on the nature or extent of powers deserves special
attention in its formulation. The draftsman can soundly recommend
periodic reappraisal of the charter in the light of local experience,
of improvements made by other cities, and of new general statutes
or new interpretations of old ones. The charter should grow with
its municipality- in content as distinct from bulk.
For the individual undaunted by temporary frustration, imbued
with a relish for complicated problems and an enthusiam for language, rigorously disciplined to hew to high standards and to release nothing short of excellent, and blessed with the capacity to seek
his satisfaction in a useful job well done rather than in political fanfare or histrionics before a jury, the art of draftsmanship is fascinating.
A constant diet of it is too heavy; but the solid feeling that follows
the creation of a work accurate, comprehensive yet concise, clear,
readable, and apparently simple is at the least as rewarding as any
experience enjoyed by the attorney and the political scientist. And
there are good fees in it, too.

TABLE OF HEADINGS

I.
IL

I1.

Legal Status .......

AND

SUBHEADINGS

................

415

Methods of Establishment ....
............
I. Florida Constitutional Provisions ..
.........
2. Current Florida Statutory Methods ..
........
General Law ......
..............
Special Act .....
..............

416
417
420
420
421

Types of Municipal Government ....
1. Mayor-Council ......
2. City Commission .....

...........
..............
.............

422
422
423

.............

423

3. Council-Manager .....

279See the detailed discussion of relative rank in V, 2 supra. Existing and
future grants of power by general law can, and normally should, be additionally
incorporated by reference, of course.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol6/iss3/7

68

Miller and Dauer: Municipal Charters in Florida: Law and Drafting
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
IV.
V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

Initial Boundaries

.........

General Powers of Municipalities ......
1. Constant Limitations .......
2. Rank of General and Special Acts ....
3. Standard General Powers .......
4. Special Problems Related to General Powers .
Hospitals ....
..........
Recreation
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
Advertising and Public Events ....
Airports ....
..........
Seaports ....
..........
Public Housing ...
........
Motor Vehicle Parking ..
......

.

.

.

.

. 426

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

427
428
429
430
435
436
436
437
437
438
438
443

Expansion and Annexation .....
...........
I. General Law Annexation by Vote ...........
Tracts with Less than Ten Registered Voters ....
Tracts with Ten through Ten Thousand Registered Voters.
Cities of Over Ten Thousand Inhabitants .......
Annexation of One Municipality by Another ....
2. Special Act Annexation .....
...........
3. Basic Limitations on Annexation ...
........

449
45U
450
451
451
451
452
452

Relations of City and County ....
..........
1. Consolidation of Functions ....
..........
2. Increased Rates for Services Outside City Limits ....

455
456
459

Methods of Revsiing or Amending Charters ...
1. Special Act . . . . . . . ..
2. Statutory Li rnited Municipal Home Rule ..
Drafting Techniqjue ..
.
1. Ascertainmennt of the Problem
2. Research
. . . . .
Legal Ba ckground .....
Form Ba ckground .....
Fact Back ground ......
3. Organization
. . . .
Simple Drraft .......
Comprehe nsive Redraft .....
4. Polishing
. . . . .
Accuracy . . . . .
Clarity
. . . . .
Concisenes
.
.
.
.
. . . .
Readabilit
5. Checking
. . . . .

..............
....
. . ..

Conclusion

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

..
.

. . ..
. . ..
. . ..
.
.
..
....
. . ..
.

..

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1953

.

.......
. ... . . .
......

.........
.
. ..........
.
..........
............
.
.............
.
..........
.
.
.
.s
.
. . .
.
.
.

460
460
460

...

. ..

...

..

.

... .
... .
... .
.....
. ..
... .

..
..
..
.
.
..

467
468
469
469
469
471
472
473
473
474
474
475
475
475
476

. ..

478

.

.
.
.
.

.

...

69

